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Abstract
This thesis examines the effectiveness of the Northrop Grumman B-21 long
range strike bomber in advancing the ability of U.S. policy makers to achieve national
security objectives. The operational value of the B-21 is assessed through analysing its
probable role in four hypothetical combat scenarios, and the relative effectiveness of the
B-21 is measured alongside the potential performance of alternative systems. This
operational analysis is augmented by a consideration of the shape of recent U.S. national
security strategies, as well as the anticipated future security environment, which provides
the foundation of an analysis of the ability of the B-21 to support U.S. security objectives
within the context of U.S. policy makers' intended approach to foreign policy. This
thesis concludes that the B-21 provides a limited increase in the effectiveness of U.S.
military operations, and its procurement is incompatible with the anticipated future shape
of U.S. security strategy and global interaction.
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Glossary of Abbreviations

A2AD

Anti-Access Area Denial

CEP

Circular Error Probable

CAS

Close Air Support

DoD

Department of Defense (U.S.)

HALE

High-Altitude Long Endurance

IADS

Integrated Air Defence System

ISIL

Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant

ISR

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance

JASSM

Joint Air-to-Surface Stand-Off Missile

JDAM

Joint Direct Attack Munition

LRSB

Long Range Strike Bomber

LRSO

Long Range Stand-Off

MANPADS

Man-Portable Air Defence System

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

RPA

Remotely Piloted Aircraft

UN

United Nations
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Chapter One: Introduction

"Hitler built walls round his 'Fortress Europe' but he forgot to put a roof on it."
F.D. Roosevelt, 19431
On the 27th of October 2015, the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) announced
the award of a $55bn contract to Northrop Grumman for the production of a new Long
Range Strike Bomber (LRSB), designated the "B-21".2 This contract marked the end of
a research and design phase that had lasted for almost a decade, and started the wheels
turning on the production of the first new U.S. long range strike aircraft since the twentyfirst, and final, B-2 'Spirit' rolled off Northrop Grumman's production line and entered
service in 1997.3 Never before has the U.S. spent so long without a LRSB either in
production or being designed under contract.4

1

Donald L. Miller, Masters of the Air: America's Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi
Germany (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2007), 202.
2

U.S. Department of Defense, "Air Force awards contract for long range strike bomber," Defense.gov,
October 27, 2015, accessed October 28, 2015, http://www.defense.gov/News-ArticleView/Article/626137/air-force-awards-contract-for-long-range-strike-bomber.
3

Anthony Murch, The Next Generation Bomber: Background, Oversight Issues, and Options for Congress
(Washington: D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 6.
4

Major Kenneth Fetters, The Role of the Long-Range Strategic Bomber (Alabama: United States Air Force
Center for Unconventional Weapons Studies, 2014), 7.
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Superficially, this decision seems to be consistent with historic military
procurement practice: an upgrade in capability, building on existing aircraft to provide a
seamless transition to a system designed to be able to deliver ordnance more efficiently
and effectively than its predecessors. The equivalent, perhaps, of re-soling a pair of
patent leather brogues that are wearing through after many years of use. However,
taking this analogy further, re-soling the old pair of shoes does not necessarily make
them appropriate for future use. No matter the skill of the cobbler, it is unlikely that the
brogues will be suitable footwear if the wearer is attempting to play tennis.
The decision to procure a new LRSB, 're-soling' the existing U.S. LRSB fleet,
should not, therefore, be a foregone conclusion, regardless of any perceived shortfall in
the current or anticipated future performance of existing U.S. LRSBs. Such an order
should not simply represent the purchase of a new system for the U.S. military to deploy
in combat, but rather be a statement of purpose, an effective tool that, within the context
of U.S. grand strategy, increases the effectiveness of the military component of foreign
policy.
This thesis will examine the relevance of the B-21 to U.S. force projection and
thus U.S. national security. I will conclude that the procurement of the system does not
represent an appropriate appropriation of U.S. Air Force funds and the DoD has
committed to spending billions of dollars on a system that is unlikely to radically
improve the effectiveness of the U.S. military in enhancing the security of the state. The
ultimate decision to approve a design and procure the aircraft appears to have been made
on the basis of a time- and capability-based upgrade package to improve the existing
2

LRSB fleet, rather than against the backdrop of a comprehensive understanding of the
future role of such a fleet in U.S. security policy in the current and future context.

Thesis Structure
My conclusion rests on an analysis of the effectiveness of the B-21 in various
conflict situations. The potential shape and scope of U.S. involvement in these conflicts
is influenced by the foreign policy strategy of the Presidential Administration, a strategy
which is itself a function of the Administration’s perception of the existing and future
international political environment. Consequently, the first section of this paper contains
a brief consideration of the evolution of U.S. security strategy since the mid-1990s,
based on the National Security Strategies of the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama
Administrations, as well as the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and the National
Intelligence Council's Global Trends reports of the same time period.

The second

section considers the emerging and existing external threats to the security of the U.S.
and its allies, the possible global pressure-points or events that could lead to U.S.
military action, and the current U.S. military posture in the region from which this threat
emanates.
The third section considers the likely performance of the B-21 in real-world
environments. This section describes four hypothetical scenarios in which the system's
effectiveness can be scrutinised, encompassing a range of conflict forms and against a
variety of opposition. I commence each scenario with a description of the context,
followed by an exploration of the strategic considerations for the U.S. military. The final
section of each scenario analysis focuses on the effect that the deployment that the B-21
3

could have, and the potential for other systems or weapons to perform the same role.
The scenarios in the analysis do not represent all possible conflicts that could involve the
U.S. military in the next decade and were created on the basis of their relevance to U.S.
security and representation of a broad spectrum of types of conflict. Each of these
scenarios highlights the probable efficacy of the B-21 in coercing or defeating
adversaries of the U.S. through an assessment of both its potential benefits and any
operational shortfalls that may prevent the system from performing the role for which it
is intended. This contextualises the discussion surrounding the B-21 through the lens of
real-world events.

Each scenario assumes that U.S. policy makers have made the

decision to use kinetic force, or the threat of kinetic force, to resolve the conflict. I do
not consider in this paper the relative effectiveness of this approach against diplomatic
solutions, or the use of non-kinetic coercive tools such as economic sanctions or cyberattacks.
The fourth section of the paper contains a consideration of the financial
implications of the procurement of the B-21 from Northrop Grumman on the U.S.
defence industrial complex, as well as the psychological effect of demonstrating such
technological expertise on the policy makers of the U.S.'s near-peer competitors. In the
final section of analysis, I examine two further military systems currently under
development that have been mooted as alternative long range strike vehicles: the Prompt
Global Strike missile system and weaponised High-Altitude, Long Endurance (HALE)
remotely piloted aircraft (RPA). A direct comparison is difficult given the embryonic
stage of their development, but studying their proposed capabilities provides further
insight into the lack of unique effectiveness provided by the B-21. In the Conclusion I
4

explore the likely performance of the system as a deterrent, as well as how it would fit in
the context of the grand strategic options available to U.S. policy makers, drawing
together the analysis of the effectiveness of the B-21 in conflict scenarios. Ultimately,
the rationale behind its procurement is flawed and the aircraft is unlikely to improve the
ability of U.S. policy makers to enhance state security.

Definitions
I describe the military hardware referenced in this paper as a "system" or
"platform".

The basis of this demarcation encompasses both the capability of the

equipment and the role that it is performing. "System" describes equipment used in an
operation wherein mission-critical sensors, software, and hardware are predominantly
self-contained and integrated in the equipment, thereby allowing its operator to impose
costs on the adversary absent the addition of numerous external auxiliary components.
This would include a strike aircraft self-designating a target against which to deploy
ordnance, and an air defence missile launched autonomously against incoming ordnance.
A "platform" describes equipment which facilitates further action wherein, in order for
costs to be imposed on the adversary, external auxiliary components or inputs are
required. This would include an aircraft deploying ordnance against a target laserdesignated by a third party, or an aircraft collecting and disseminating ISR information.
I define military operations in this paper as "strategic" or "tactical". "Strategic"
operations are those that attempt to impact the adversary's ability to wage war without
being restricted to being in proximity to or engaging their military force directly. This
does not preclude attacks on the adversary's forces but, to remain categorised as strategic
5

strikes, such attacks must not be in direct support or advance of tactical operations.
"Tactical" operations are those that attempt to achieve or assist in achieving a specific
short-term military objective, in close proximity to or engaging the opposition's military
force.
"Deterrence" and "coercion" are simultaneously components of, and aims within,
the toolkit of U.S. policy makers. Their difference is rooted in the timing of action or
threat. Coercion is responsive, where one or more parties respond to the activities of
another by initiating an action that is intended to impose, or threatens to impose,
unbearable costs on the opposition. The opposition is offered the opportunity to prevent
the imposition of more costs if they conform to the requests of the coercing party. The
limited use of force may be used to "communicate...the power to hurt", but is not an end
in itself.5

Using NATO's definition, deterrence "is the threat of force in order to

discourage an opponent from taking an unwelcome action".6 The primary form that this
takes is through the threat of response, "deterrence by punishment", and described in this
paper as "active deterrence".7

This relies on the belief of the opposition that the

deterring party would be able to impose costs that outweigh the benefit of the potential
action. Deterrence is also manifested through the demonstration of resilience, which I
refer to in this paper as "passive deterrence".8 This relies on the belief of the opposition
5

Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 3.

6

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do," accessed January 19,
2015, http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2015/Also-in-2015/deterrence-russia-military/EN/index.htm.
7

Ibid.

8

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation, "Deterrence: what it can (and cannot) do"; Andrew F Krepinevic Jr.,
"Strategy in a time of austerity," Foreign Affairs Volume 91, Issue 6: 67.

6

that they are unable to impose costs on the deterring party that will be significant enough
to engender the outcome that they desire. As "unmistakably offensive weapons", LRSBs
are generally, although not exclusively, a function of active, rather than passive,
deterrence but have, according to former Defense Secretary Hagel, been "essential for
keeping our deterrent edge".9
Coercion is also differentiated from 'hot war' through intent. 'Hot war' is, to use
Schelling's terminology, "brute force".10 It is the ultimate expression of coercion, aiming
to make a belligerent change their position, but through the "elimination of a military
obstacle", and, if the required concessions are not made, potentially concluding with the
complete destruction of the ability of the opposition to function.11 Coercion may use
force, but this force is leveraged on the understanding that "it is the expectation of more
violence that gets the wanted behaviour".12

The History of Airborne Long Range Strike
Understanding the place of long range strike aircraft in the pantheon of options
available to policy-makers requires an appreciation of the history of such systems. This
must encompass the aircraft themselves, their performance and capabilities, and the
strategic thinking that underpinned their development and role in conflict.
9

Rebecca Grant, Return of the Bomber: The Future of Long Range Strike (Arlington: Air Force
Association, 2007), 31; Andrew Tilghman, "Hagel backs Air Force plans for long-range strike bomber,"
MilitaryTimes.com, January 13, 2015, accessed August 20, 2015,
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/01/13/hagel-backs-air-force-plans-for-longrange-strike-bomber/21713815/.
10

Schelling, Arms and Influence, 1.

11

Ibid., 2.

12

Ibid., 3.
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Aerial bombardment commenced within months of the first use of an aircraft in a
military context. In November 1911 Lt. Giulio Gavotti dropped explosives on Turkish
troops. Although it does not appear that any damage was caused, the precedent was set
and the delivery of explosives from aircraft became a regular feature of sorties flown
during the latter years of the First World War.13 However, given the relatively limited
range of the aircraft and the predominant strategic thinking of military commanders,
which conceived of ground forces as being the decisive factor in the conflict and aircraft
playing a directly supporting role, the majority of bombing missions were tactical in
nature and did not require interdiction markedly beyond the combat zone.14 In addition,
the weight of ordnance that could be carried by aircraft, and the accuracy with which it
could be delivered, limited the efficacy of aerial bombardment against targets that
required any degree of precision.15 Nevertheless, the rapid development of aircraft
technology, in conjunction with evolving strategic thinking, facilitated the emergence of
long range bombing. Notably, the German Air Force used Gotha bombers and Zeppelin
airships to drop bombs on London, bringing the conflict directly to the civilian
population. Although physical damage was limited, the psychological effect of the
operations was more significant.16

13

Stephen Budiansky, Air Power: The men, machines, and ideas that revolutionized war, from Kitty Hawk
to Gulf War II (New York: Viking, 2004), 45.
14

Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air, translated by Dino Ferrari (Washington, D.C.: CowardMcCann, 1998), 10.
15

Budiansky, Air Power, 94.

16

Budiansky, Air Power, 90.
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During the inter-war period concepts of the strategic potential of air power
evolved, in particular the idea of expanding the combat zone and targeting the civilian
population with kinetic force deployed from the air.17 Such action was intended to cause
a critical collapse in morale that would lead to the capitulation of a state without
requiring the total defeat of their military. One of the chief proponents of the concept of
strategic bombing, the Italian military strategist Giulio Douhet, predicted that "citizens
will be combatants...in [the] face of the technical development of aviation [there is] no
effective defense against determined efforts of the enemy to bomb our cities". 18 The
Hague Convention of 1907 had prohibited "the attack or bombardment, by whatever
means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended", leaving the
obvious potential for the legal bombardment of defended locations.19 The 1923 Hague
Rules of Air Warfare prescribed more stringent requirements on belligerents, designating
aerial bombardment "legitimate only when directed at a military objective, that is to say,
an object of which the destruction or injury would constitute a distinct military
advantage to the belligerent".20 These laws were never formally accepted by the major
powers.21

17

Ibid., 133.

18

Douhet, Command of the Air, 10.

19

International Conferences (The Hague), Hague Convention (IV) Respecting the Laws and Customs of
War on Land and Its Annex: Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, October 18,
1907, accessed November 5, 2015, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/hague04.asp.
20

"The Hague Rules of Air Warfare: Article 22" The Hague, February, 1923, published on LawofWar.org,
accessed August 8, 2015,
http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm.http://lawofwar.org/hague_rules_of_air_warfare.htm.
21

Howard M. Hensel, The Legitimate Use of Military Force: The Just War Tradition and the Customary
Law of Armed Conflict (Surrey, England: Ashgate, 2008), 194.

9

The latter years of the Second World War marked the most intensive use of
LRSBs, with senior Allied air force personnel adhering to the concept of Sir Stanley
Baldwin, the British Prime Minister, that "the bomber will always get through", even in
the face of mounting losses, and arguing that strategic bombing would be sufficient to
force Nazi Germany to capitulate.22

Three distinct facets of long range bombing

emerged that have defined the subsequent use of LRSBs. The first was the saturation
bombing of industrial zones and transport hubs, which was intended to have the secondorder effect of causing the civilian population to pressure the political leadership to
surrender. The lack of accuracy in the delivery of ordnance and the resilience of the
production lines and rail networks ultimately meant that such attempts were not as
effective in disrupting the German war effort as had been anticipated.23 The second facet
was precision attacks against targets behind the front line whose destruction were
intended to provide a strategic advantage. Such raids required particular skill and were
generally undertaken by specialised squadrons equipped with advanced bomb-aiming
equipment, the most notable being the R.A.F.'s 617 Squadron, whose aircraft destroyed
the Möhne and Edersee dams, sank the battleship 'Tirpitz' and collapsed the tunnels that
were to house the V3 long range guns.24 The third facet was the use of LRSBs in a
tactical capacity in support of ground operations. The degree of accuracy required to
perform this role was often lacking, as demonstrated by the failure of LRSBs to destroy

22

HC Deb 10 November 1932, vol 270, col 631.

23

Budiansky, Air Power, 301.

24

Paul Brickhill, The Dam Busters (London: Pan Books, 1999).
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the gun emplacements that were covering the Normandy beaches assaulted on D-Day.25
Furthermore, attempts to degrade the defences at Caen and Monte Casino prior to a landbased assault were ineffective due to an over-estimation of the ability of the ordnance
deployed to critically degrade German defences.26
Long range bombing was not exclusive to the European theatre. The 'Doolittle
Raid' on Tokyo in April 1942 gave a demonstration of the psychological effects that long
range bombing could have. Sixteen North American B-25 'Mitchell' aircraft, deployed
from an aircraft carrier in the Pacific, dropped ordnance on Tokyo.

Although the

military benefits of the sortie were limited, the raid demonstrated the vulnerability of
Japan to aerial assault, despite the nominal front lines of the conflict in the Pacific theatre
being far removed from the main Japanese islands.27

Although the primary stated

intention of the Allied heavy bombing campaign in both Japan and Germany was to
directly disrupt the Axis war effort through strikes on targets such as transport networks
and manufacturing plants, civilian casualties were high. This was heightened by the use
of incendiary munitions, particularly in cities in which there was a high proportion of
wooden buildings, leading to 'Fire Storms' in cities such as Dresden, Hamburg, and
Tokyo in which the cumulative total of civilian casualties are estimated to have
numbered over 170,000.28 The dropping of nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki

25

Anthony Beevor, D-Day: The Battle for Normandy (London: Penguin, 2009), 91.

26

Budiansky, Air Power, 305.

27

Ibid., 268.

28

Richard G. Davis, Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institute
Press, 1992), 426, 557; Budiansky, Air Power, 338.
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in August 1945 was the apotheosis of long range bombing, combining the penetrative
capability of the long range bombers with the destructive power of atomic bombs.
After the losses suffered by air force personnel in long range bombing missions,
the nuclear raids demonstrated the potential ability of LRSBs to perform the strategic
role that had been prophesied with the bomber 'getting through', regardless of the
defensive systems. However, subsequent historiographical debate as to whether the
nuclear raids caused the ultimate surrender of Japan, as well as the failure of strategic
bombing to cause the German civilian population to turn against the Nazi party, are
indicative of the inability of strategic bombing to have the effect that had been expected
by its proponents. Nevertheless, the concept of using LRSBs to deliver nuclear ordnance
against cities would become a critical component of Cold War strategy.29
Although the nuclear mission was a primary focus of LRSBs during the Cold
War, their most notable actions were in a conventional strike capacity. The culmination
of strategic air operations by U.S. forces in the Vietnam war was Operation Linebacker
II, which took place in December, 1972 and involved more than 200 LRSBs over an
eleven-day campaign to destroy major target complexes in the Hanoi and Haiphong
areas.30 This task could only be performed by LRSBs because of their extensive range
and payload advantage over alternative contemporary ground-attack aircraft. In spite of
over 700 sorties being flown by Boeing B-52 'Stratofortresses' and widespread damage

29

Budiansky, Air Power, 353.

30

Marshall Michel, "The Christmas Bombing," AirSpaceMag.com, January, 2001, accessed December 26,
2015, http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/the-christmas-bombing-1813815/?no-ist.
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to North Vietnamese infrastructure, U.S. policy makers were criticised for the
indiscriminate nature of the bombing and it is difficult to objectively identify significant
advantages that the U.S. gained from the campaign, even if popular understanding in the
U.S. was that it had been successful.31 In addition, the B-52 force suffered heavy losses,
indicating that, without much improved survivability, air defence systems had negated
the penetration capability of the contemporary LRSBs.
Operation Niagara II, which took place between January and March 1968, also
demonstrated the firepower that the USAF LRSB fleet could bring to bear in the
Vietnam War, and hinted at the future close air support(CAS) role that U.S. LRSBs
would play as more advanced tactical precision munitions became available. Arguably
"the most concentrated application of aerial firepower in the history of warfare",
Operation Niagara II involved a combination of medium range strike aircraft and around
sixty B-52s delivering ordnance to support U.S. ground forces that had been surrounded
at the combat base of Khe Sanh.32 In total, the B-52s delivered almost 60,000 tons of
ordnance, and the degree of damage that the aircraft caused led U.S. General
Westmoreland to claim that the B-52s "broke the back of the North Vietnamese Army at
Khe Sanh".33 However, later analysis of the air campaign cast some doubt over this
claim. In particular, the B-52 missions required a fifteen-hour lead time, making them
significantly less flexible than artillery and medium range aircraft, and the North
31

Bob Woodward, The Last of the President's Men (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2015),113.

32

James H. Willbanks, The Tet Offensive: A Concise History (New York: Columbia University Press,
2007), 22.
33

Peter Brush, "Operation Niagara: Siege of Khe Sanh," HistoryNet, June 12, 2006, accessed April 19,
2016, http://www.historynet.com/operation-niagara-siege-of-khe-sanh.htm.
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Vietnamese forces usually had "timely and accurate warnings of impending B-52
attacks".34

In addition, there was reluctance among the ground forces to trust the

accuracy of the bombing and, in the initial phase of Operation Niagara II, the B-52s were
prohibited from deploying ordnance closer than two miles from U.S. troops.35
Operation Black Buck, which took place during the Falkland's War, demonstrated
the potential of LRSBs to strike targets that were perceived to be invulnerable due to
their distance from weapons systems that had enough power to disrupt Argentine
operations.

This mission moved away from the saturation bombing of Operation

Linebacker II and focussed on a single strategic target: the runway at Port Stanley's
airport. Avro 'Vulcan' LRSBs of the Royal Air Force performed what were then the
longest-ranged bombing sorties undertaken, flying from Ascension Island, almost 7,000
nautical miles from the target. The raid did not cause lasting damage to the airstrip but
proved the potential for LRSBs to cover long distances and deliver ordnance accurately
against a precise target.
The changing nature of warfare following the end of the Cold War has required
LRSBs to be able to perform a more tactical role in order to remain relevant to the
prevalent military operations, with "moving target and maritime targeting solutions" now
almost pre-requisites in "contemporary strike missions".36 This has been apparent in the
34

Brush, "Operation Niagara."

35

John Morocco, Thunder From Above: Air War, 1941-1968 (Boston, MA: Boston Publishing Company,
1984), 179.
36

Lt. Col. Jeff Schreiner, "B-2 Pilot’s Lessons For LRSB, America’s New Bomber,"
BreakingDefense.com, September 16, 2014, accessed August 28, 2015,
http://breakingdefense.com/2014/09/b-2-pilots-lessons-for-lrsb-americas-new-bomber/.
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Middle East where U.S. LRSBs have used precisely-targeted ordnance against targets of
opportunity and in a (CAS) role. Despite its status as the "only nuclear capable bomber
capable of employing long range standoff weapons", in recent conflicts the role of the B52 has been to loiter over the combat zone and respond to the requests of ground forces
to deploy short or medium range ordnance, rather than striking static locations that were
designated as aiming points prior to the commencement of the sortie. 37 Indicative of the
perceived flexibility of LRSBs in strategic thinking, more traditional LRSB missions
have also taken place, notably the ultimately aborted attacks on Libya using Northrop
Grumman B-2 'Spirits'. Furthermore, in the first three days of Operation Enduring
Freedom, B-2s undertook six missions, each of which was a seventy-hour round-trip
sortie launched from and ultimately recovering to Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri,
following a crew change-over in Diego Garcia, and ordnance deployed from B-2s struck
ninety-six targets in and around Baghdad on the first night of Operation Iraqi Freedom.38
In addition, LRSB fleets are being used by Russian and U.S. policy makers in
shows of force. Although these missions are not intended to include the delivery of
ordnance, they are a reminder that a LRSB can threaten the security of a state even if no
ground combat is taking place and the state from which the aircraft are launched is
situated thousands of miles away.

Russian Tupolev Tu-95 'Bear' LRSBs regularly

37

Jeremiah Gertler, U.S. Air Force bomber sustainment and modernisation: Background and Issues for
Congress (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2014), 16; Grant, Return of the Bomber,
14.
38

David Noland, "The Bone is back," Air and Space Magazine, May, 2008, accessed September 11, 2015,
http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/the-bone-is-back-25563932/?no-ist; Global Security, "B-2
Operations," GlobalSecurity.org, accessed April 19, 2016, http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/systems/b2-ops.htm; Fox News, "B-2 Bombers Lead 'Shock and Awe' ," FoxNews.com, March 26, 2003, accessed
April 19, 2016, http://www.foxnews.com/story/2003/03/26/b-2-bombers-lead-shock-and-awe.html.
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encroach on the airspace of NATO states, and U.S. B-52s were flown close to North
Korea following the nuclear test of January, 2016, as well as challenging the Chinese
attempts to control the air zone around the Spratly Islands.39

Operational U.S. Long Range Strike Bombers
The LRSB fleet has been "one of the most flexible and lethal tools" of the U.S.
military, with the systems providing access to targets without requiring the conquest of
territory.40 However, the ability of the U.S.'s current fleet of LRSBs to operate with
impunity is being degraded by the increasingly sophisticated Anti-Access Area Denial
(A2AD) capabilities of states, notably China and Russia.41 Consequently, although the
aircraft have the potential to accurately deliver a significant weight and range of
ordnance, for more than eighty-two percent of the U.S. LRSBs, their operation is
becoming viable only in a permissive air environment as their detection, interception,
and destruction is otherwise likely to occur due to the development of modernised
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integrated air defence systems (IADS) and networks nullifying their defensive
capabilities.42
The existing fleet comprises three aircraft types: the Boeing B-52 'Stratofortress',
the Rockwell B-1B 'Lancer' and the Northrop Grumman B-2 'Spirit'. Appreciating their
unique strengths and vulnerabilities provides context to the perceived requirement for a
new system, and also a foundation for current U.S. perceptions of the value and role of
LRSBs in security policy and conflict.
Boeing B-52 'Stratofortress'
With the first variant introduced in 1952, the B-52 is the numerical mainstay of
the U.S. LRSB fleet with fifty-eight aircraft operational and eighteen in reserve, and is
intended to be in operation "until at least the 2040 time period".43 As a "standing symbol
of U.S. power", B-52s have been deployed in U.S. bases across the globe and, at 8,800
miles, extended by air-to-air refuelling, has the longest range of the aircraft in the U.S.
LRSB fleet.44 In addition, the B-52 is "capable of dropping or launching the widest array
of weapons in the U.S. inventory", both nuclear and conventional, and can carry a
maximum payload of 70,000lb.45
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However, the B-52's survivability in contested air environments is limited. In the
strategic context in which it was designed, LRSBs were still generally conceived as
participating in mass raids and saturating a target with ordnance, rather than conducting
precision strikes on multiple targets. Suppression of air defences would primarily be
conducted by other strike aircraft supporting the B-52's mission.

The increasing

accuracy of air-to-ground targeting systems and precision guided weaponry has meant
that the B-52 is now capable of performing missions against targets that require extreme
precision. The weight of ordnance that can be carried and the long-endurance feature of
the aircraft mean that it has been of great value in recent conflicts in the Middle East,
directly supporting ground operations. However, the survivability shortfall remains.
The 50,000ft ceiling of the B-52 does not provide immunity from surface-to-air missile
systems larger than Man-Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) and, although it
carries sophisticated jamming systems, it is unlikely to survive in anything other than
extremely low-threat environments without support.46
Rockwell B-1B 'Lancer'
The B-1B is the only super-sonic LRSB in the U.S. fleet. Initially developed in
the 1970s as a replacement for the B-52, the first B-1 project was halted before being
resurrected by the President Reagan administration in 1981 with the aircraft, designated
the B-1B, becoming operational in 1986. Despite numerous calls for the B-1B to be
retired or the fleet reduced from its current roster of sixty-two aircraft, the aircraft has
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provided support for ground operations in the Middle East.47 Forty percent of the total
tonnage of ordnance dropped by coalition aircraft in the first six months of Operation
Enduring Freedom were deployed by B-1Bs.48 At around 7,500 miles, the B-1B has a
slightly shorter maximum range than the B-52 but with a payload of 75,000lb it has a
greater carrying capacity than any other aircraft in the U.S. LRSB fleet, although this
does not include nuclear ordnance.49
Although the B-1B has a relatively low observable profile it was designed to
penetrate air defence systems primarily through its velocity and a low-altitude
approach.50 The success of such tactics relies on the adversary being unable to acquire
and maintain a lock on the B-1B. At the time of its introduction, the performance of the
B-1B made this tactic viable. However, more modern IADS have a far greater ability to
acquire and intercept a B-1B, and the aircraft is unlikely to be able to operate effectively
in a contested air environment against a technologically advanced opponent without
meaningful support.51
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Northrop Grumman B-2 'Spirit'
The most modern aircraft in the U.S. LRSB fleet, the B-2 was optimised for low
observability, with the intention of evading detection by enemy radar before delivering
conventional or nuclear weapons. The original design process commenced during the
Cold War with an anticipated production run of one hundred aircraft. The collapse of the
Soviet Union altered the strategic landscape and only twenty-one B-2s were built, with
an individual unit cost of around $1bn.52 Nevertheless, the decrease in the perceived
requirement for a strategic nuclear weapon delivery system at the end of the Cold War
did not negate the capability of the B-2 as a mechanism for deploying conventional
ordnance, due to its low observability. As a result, its function was expanded to facilitate
the delivery of "large numbers of satellite-guided bombs", rather than being focused on
strategic nuclear strike.53
The B-2 is ordinarily based at Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, and is rarely
deployed from overseas bases since the systems were withdrawn from permanent
deployment at Anderson Air Force Base, Guam, in 2010.54 The aircraft has a maximum
range of just under 7,000 miles. Consequently, from Whiteman a B-2 is able to reach the
western border of Iraq, if it flew eastwards, and Japan if it flew west, although in both
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instances the aircraft would require refuelling if it were to return to its home base in a
single mission. The B-2 has a maximum payload of 40,000lb, which can be configured
to carry both conventional or nuclear weapons. The low observable characteristics of the
aircraft have not been comprehensively tested in a battlefield environment, with combat
operations limited to a relatively minor role over Kosovo, Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya;
in total, four B-2s were deployed in the first month of Operation Iraqi Freedom.55
The aircraft's design continues to render it undetectable in most circumstances
although this is changing with the latest "long-wavelength search radars".56 The B-2
relies almost entirely on remaining undetected.

Once acquired and locked, its

survivability is low. In the short term it seems likely that the B-2 will continue to be able
to conduct night-time missions within the airspace of states hostile to the U.S. with a
limited possibility of detection. It should not, however, be assumed that this will always
be the case and the improving capability of detection systems could render the B-2
almost valueless in operating within an air environment contested by a technologically
capable adversary.
Likely Performance Attributes of the B-21
Despite the secrecy surrounding the B-21, certain suppositions can be made from
the information that has been released by the DoD. The initial contract awarded to
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Northrop Grumman required the construction of one hundred aircraft.

The DoD

anticipates that the B-21 will ultimately replace the entire U.S. LRSB fleet after its
introduction, expected to be in 2025.
The B-21's range has not been disclosed by Northrop Grumman or the DoD.
However, because the DoD has designated the aircraft as a 'Long Range Strike Bomber'
with "the ability to cross the globe in hours" it is likely that its range will be at least
5,000 miles un-refuelled, and probably akin to the B-2.57 Given the number of B-21s to
be produced it also seems unlikely that they will all be based with the B-2s at Whiteman
Air Force Base and there has been no confirmation as to whether they are ultimately
intended to remain based in the U.S. homeland or be permanently deployed overseas.
Although it is unlikely to be nuclear-capable as soon as it is operational, a
primary specification of the B-21 was that it should be capable of deploying nuclear
weapons.58 Because of the DoD's intention to replace the U.S. LRSB fleet with this
system it seems likely that all conventional air-to-ground weapons in the U.S. arsenal
will be able to be deployed from it.59 Notably, this would include the Boeing GBU57A/B 'Massive Ordnance Penetrator', which is intended to be used against buried or
heavily fortified targets, and the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). The DoD also
anticipates that the B-21 will deploy the next-generation Long Range Standoff (LRSO)
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Cruise Missile, which has a projected range of around 1,500 miles.60 If this is the case,
the B-21 may not be required to penetrate too deeply into enemy airspace to deliver the
ordnance, particularly if the missile is capable of loitering and selecting an appropriate
static or moving target autonomously. Consequently, the B-21 could potentially remain
outside the A2AD network of the opposition force and launch the weapon to either hit
pre-defined co-ordinates, or loiter and search for moving targets in a designated area.
It has also been suggested by the DoD that the B-21 will have the capability not
only to deploy ordnance, but "act as a critical node inside the future combat cloud". 61 In
order to perform this role, the system would also carry intelligence, surveillance and
reconnaissance (ISR) sensors, as well as communications hardware. If this is the case, it
is unclear whether the system would be intended to perform this role simultaneously
with bombing missions. However, the assignment of all of the B-21s to Air Force
Global Strike Command suggests that its primary functions remains the deployment of
ordnance.62
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Basing the design on the assumption that "the stealthy LRSB is crucial
to...project military power at any time and place" (author's emphasis), the B-21 will have
a low observable profile; the initial designs suggest that its basic airframe is similar to
that of the B-2.63 It is thus likely to have a sub-sonic flight profile, at least when
operating within range of adversaries' radar systems.

Although it is not mutually

exclusive, if the design emphasises stealth its post-detection survivability is likely to be
compromised through a lack of speed and manoeuvrability, relying on jamming or
spoofing any anti-aircraft missiles that are launched against it. The specifications of the
B-21 also claim that it will be "optionally manned".64 This does not mean that the
system will, as a primary flight configuration, be remotely piloted; the Boeing 777 is
technically "optionally manned" simply because of the technical assistance provided to
its aircrew by electronic systems.65 Furthermore, although the prospect of the B-21
being remotely piloted potentially increases the performance envelope of the system,
while also creating new operational vulnerabilities, the improvement in capability is
difficult to quantify. It is also unlikely to significantly modify the fundamental strategic
function of the system.
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Chapter Two: The Evolution of U.S. Global Outlook and Foreign Policy

The broad function of U.S. Presidential Administrations remains consistent,
centred on the responsibility for the physical security of U.S. citizens against attack by
states or militant non-state organisations. Nevertheless, the foreign policy and security
position of respective Presidential Administrations, which are outlined in the National
Security Strategies and, in later years, the Quadrennial Defense Reviews, are not
unchanging. They are set against the backdrop of a particular understanding of the
drivers of the international system, their interpretation of the role of the U.S. in that
system, and an evolving global context.
The Global Trends reports published by the National Intelligence Council every
four years since 1997 also give an indication of the perceived direction of international
relations and the drivers that will influence it. This provides further context to the
Administrations' policies in elucidating the anticipated future challenges to the U.S.
against which their policies are intended to hedge. This changing context is exemplified
by the consideration of the impact of radical Islam on international security in the Global
Trends report written in 2004.66 Although Islamic extremism had been referenced in the
two previous versions of the document as a potential destabilising influence in particular
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states, in 2004 it is ascribed far greater importance as a driver that directly affects the
global community in its own right.
The stability of the international system and the relationship between the U.S.
and its allies are critical themes that run through the National Security Strategies of the
Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations, and the Quadrennial Defense
Reviews. Overall, there is an acknowledgement that the international system is in a state
of flux. The Global Trends reports published since 2004 suggest a devolving security
situation and a growing potential for interstate conflict.

This is bolstered by the

admission in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review that the U.S. is in "a war", and the
2014 Quadrennial Defense Review states that its 2010 counterpart was a "wartime
strategy".67
The diffusion of power away from states and the increasing significance of
transnational crime or terrorist organisations and NGOs play a central role in the
National Security Strategies, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and Global Trends reports.
"Globalisation" is first referenced in the National Security Strategies in 1998, although
an appreciation of "global forces" appears in 1997.68 At the end of the twentieth century,
the National Security Strategies and Global Trends reports suggest that it is intra-state,
rather than inter-state, conflict that is likely to dominate the security environment in the
coming years. However, a changing perception is evident in the subsequent Global
67
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Trends reports, and the possibility of inter-state regional conflict starts to be considered
more likely in the fifteen-year time-frame that the report covers. This is crowned in the
2030 Global Trends report, published in 2012, in which a "conflict involving great
powers is not inconceivable", despite the "disincentives" for such an occurrence.69
The role and significance of international institutions in shaping and maintaining
global order is also central to the Administrations' strategies, and there is a heavy
emphasis on ensuring that the international system that was created following the Second
World War remains strong.

It is, however, acknowledged that this is likely to be

increasingly difficult, and the Global Trends report published in 2008 suggests that, by
2025, an "international community composed of nation states will no longer exist", while
the 2010 National Security Strategy suggests that there is a need to "modernise"
international institutions.70

This is reiterated in the Obama Administration's 2015

National Security Strategy, which stresses the importance of "fortifying" existing
international organisations to ensure their continued value.71
Closely tied to the importance of institutions, the foundation of U.S. strategy
within the Clinton, George W. Bush, and Obama Administrations is maintaining and
building leadership of the international community, with the word "lead" appearing
thirteen times in President Obama's 1,300 word preface to the 2015 National Security
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Strategy.72 With apologies to Shakespeare's Malvolio, the National Security Strategies
of all three of these Administrations suggest that the U.S. was 'born' to lead through its
resource advantages, has achieved a leadership status, and has had a position of
leadership thrust upon it by other states who are reluctant to act without the support of
the U.S.73 This responsibility is embraced rather than rejected.74 There is, however, a
self-serving component to this attitude given the "levers of power" that the U.S. can use
to shape the global system to its advantage.75 The Obama Administration's National
Security Strategies have an additional component to the requirement to lead in raising the
spectre that, without consistent U.S. demonstration of leadership in global affairs, the
state may no longer be the "security partner of choice" of other states, and U.S. policy
makers will therefore find it more difficult to shape the global order to the benefit of the
U.S.76
There is also a shift in the intended style of U.S. leadership that is apparent in the
National Security Strategies of the three most recent Presidential Administrations. In
1997, the National Security Strategy referred to "exerting leadership."77 By 2015, the
proposed leadership style had become less dominant, with the U.S. "underwriting"
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security with the intention to "provide operational support", moulding the actions of the
U.S. to those of other states.78
Similar to the changing approach to leadership, the Clinton, George W. Bush, and
Obama Administrations all stress the critical importance of alliance structures to U.S.
security, particularly with regard to managing the relationship that the U.S. has with
China and Russia, but the proposed dynamic of the relationships between the U.S. and its
allies evolves between the mid-1990s and 2015. Even in 2006, the emphasis is on
"strengthening relationships", protecting partners and "assuring" allied states of U.S.
strength and constancy.79

By 2010, however, the emphasis shifts to using alliances as

"force multipliers" to support U.S. activities, particularly with regard to military action. 80
There was a further alteration at the start of the second decade of the twenty-first
century, and increased significance is given to efforts to "build the security capacity of
partner states" in order to minimise the requirement for U.S. forces to be involved in
conflicts; in 2010, this role was stated as the third priority for the DoD in the U.S.
Quadrennial Defense Review.81
The forward deployment of U.S. forces is also a theme across the National
Security Strategies of the recent Presidential Administrations, as well as the Quadrennial
Defense Reviews. However, the primary rationale and format of forward deployment
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also appears to change between the 1996 and 2015. At the end of the twentieth century,
the central function of forward deployments is to improve the self-reliance of the U.S.
security establishment in ensuring that the U.S. military can respond swiftly to emerging
threats and deter potential attackers.82 However, the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
stresses the need for a flexible force that is ready to "surge" to the required area, rather
than having U.S. forces stationed in significant numbers overseas.83
The step back from the permanent forward deployment of large numbers of U.S.
troops outlined in these documents emphasises the perceived requirement for the U.S.
military to have power projection capability. Improving weapons technology is regularly
noted in the National Security Strategy documents, and the maintenance of a nuclear
weapons capability was stressed even during the Obama Administration. The perceived
importance of technology is also central to the concept of "Dissuasion", a strategic
approach that was outlined in the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, and has remained
at least on the fringes of U.S. security policy considerations during the subsequent
Obama Administration.84 Although dissuasion is, in essence, a form of deterrence,
unlike most U.S. deterrent strategies since the mid-1990s, which generally engage allied
states, the success of dissuasion rests solely on U.S. capability, primarily that of the U.S.
military industrial complex.

Under this approach it is intended that the U.S. can

"dissuade other countries from initiating future military competitions...through the
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conduct of its research, development, test, and demonstration program...maintaining or
enhancing advantages in key areas of military capability".85
The development of the B-21 is a reasonable example of this concept in practice,
not least because no other state has yet developed a low observable LRSB that comes
anywhere near matching the capabilities of the B-2. Dissuasion is founded on the
premise that U.S. industry is capable of continually improving existing technologies, that
such improvements cannot be matched by the technological experts of other states, and
that, over the long term, the cost of this development is outweighed by the savings made
through reducing the number of personnel in the military, whose function is replaced by
the new technological capability. The unilateral aspect of dissuasion is somewhat at
odds with the intention to work closely with regional partners and it also suffers from the
conflation of capability and effectiveness. Although the B-21 may be more capable than
an equivalent aircraft deployed by another state, and may demonstrate a level of
observability that makes it difficult for any IADS to perform a successful interception,
this does not necessarily make the aircraft an effective tool in achieving U.S. security
objectives. If this fault line in the strategy's logic is appreciated by the policy makers of
another state, U.S. military spending will only dissuade them from seeking parity in
capability, not from developing strategies that could be effective in exploiting U.S.
weaknesses. Pure military capability manifested in technological superiority, as has been
proven in numerous conflicts, is not a guarantor of victory.
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In concert with the seeming retraction of forward deployed forces, "power
projection" is given specific attention in the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, which
stresses the need to maintain "the U.S. Air Force with global power projection
capabilities".86 However, this concept is not synonymous with the total withdrawal of
U.S. forces from overseas locations and a reliance on weapons systems that deliver
ordnance at extreme ranges without the need to deploy outside the U.S.

Instead,

according to the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review, power projection includes
"preposition" and "the ability of our forces to move rapidly from place to place, and our
forces' ability to operate anywhere around the world".87 Consequently, while the LRSB
fleet may be a component of power projection capability, so is a medium range strike
aircraft that can deploy whenever or wherever it is required.
Overall, the National Security Strategies, Quadrennial Defense Reviews, and
Global Trends reports suggest that U.S. policy makers are acutely aware of the way in
which the international system is changing. There is, however, an intent to try to
maintain what they perceive to be the existing U.S. position of strength through
international organisational mechanisms.

The significance of leadership and the

intention of U.S. policy makers to fulfil a leadership role is forcefully proposed in the
2015 National Security Strategy, although the way in which this leadership is intended to
be manifested has altered since the late 1990s. Similarly, although maintaining the
ability to "act unilaterally when necessary" remains a central goal of U.S. policy makers,
the importance of working with allies and leveraging their capabilities plays an
86
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increasingly important role.88 The ultimate goal is to cement the power that the U.S. has
in the international system and community, and a function of that is demonstrating the
capability and intent to work in concert with friends and allies to the strengthen the
relationships that are required in order to meet this objective.
A new LRSB has been a procurement objective throughout the time period
covered by all of these security strategies. Despite these incremental changes that,
cumulatively, have altered the security policy of the U.S. government, the desire to
develop a new LRSB has remained. The survival of the B-21 development programme
throughout the changes in administration and policy approaches is, however, more a
testament to the inability of policy makers to modify their position on the LRSB
procurement programme than the aircraft's universal appropriateness. Slavishly adhering
to the procurement of a weapons system in which its primary capabilities, notably its
range, carrying capacity, and low observability, signal a desire to remain aloof from
close engagement and act unilaterally, fundamentally undermines a state policy that is
predicated on being an accepted global leader, building relationships with allied states in
order to help them to maintain their own security, and forward deploying military forces
when the situation demands.
Nevertheless, developing a full appreciation of the lack of value that the B-21
provides to U.S. policy makers requires the intended shape of security policy to be
operationalised and put in the context of the circumstances in which the aircraft could be
used. The following chapter therefore builds on this understanding of U.S. security
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policy through considering the potential regional challenges to U.S. security and the U.S.
policy makers' possible responses. The overlay of these insights onto the broad shape of
U.S. security policy outlined above forms the foundation of the scenario analyses that
comprise Chapter Four of this paper. This ensures that when the role of the B-21 is put
under the analytic spotlight, an appreciation of the aircraft's relative effectiveness is
developed in the context of not only military operations but also against the backdrop of
the broader consideration of U.S. security policy.
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Chapter Three: Global Threats to U.S. Security

U.S. security, in its broadest form, faces a spectrum of threats, ranging from the
infrastructure damage caused by climate change to the relative strength of the U.S.
economy being eroded by other states, particularly China. With a more traditional
understanding of security, the security of the U.S. and its allies is challenged by states
and non-state actors that have an adversarial attitude towards the state, but also by the
emergence of regional conflicts which may not directly threaten U.S. security but cause
the state's policy makers to expend resources on its resolution. It is these threats and
situations against which military force and the B-21 are likely to be leveraged.
An analysis of the global security situation reveals a plethora of potential
conflicts that could affect the population in the combat area. By dint of geographical
fortune, however, the civilian population of the U.S. is provided with a degree of
protection due to the "stopping power of water".89 Consequently, an attack on the U.S.
by state forces would be conducted through an air strike or a long range missile attack.
The threat of a terrorist attack in the U.S. homeland remains. Such an event is, in
isolation, unlikely to have as great a destructive effect as a kinetic attack by a
technologically advanced conventional force. Nevertheless, because of the importance

89

John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: Norton, 2013), 44.

35

that is given to ensuring the security of the population, it seems inevitable that the U.S.
will, as outlined in the 2015 National Security Strategy, continue to devote considerable
resources and energy in engaging in counterterrorism operations.90
The global involvement of the U.S., through both formal alliances and marketbased economic ties, means that overseas events that are not focussed on the U.S. can
nevertheless impact the state and cause the U.S. policy makers to expend resources to
ensure that the negative effects on the U.S. economy or citizens is minimised. However,
the directions from which U.S. policy makers feel that the greatest security threats to the
U.S. or its allies are most likely to emanate are indicated by the U.S. military's posture
and deployment of assets.
The presence within the U.S. military of regional commands is mirrored below in
the following exploration of the three geographic areas and states in which the
continuation of current trends has the potential to be of greatest threat to U.S. security:
East Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East, and Russia. Although South America is also
an area of focus for U.S. foreign policy, particularly given the economic ties that the U.S.
has with the region, it is of relatively low security significance by comparison to the
three regions that will be examined in this thesis. There is little imminence of the
collapse of a major South American state, which could leave a vacuum that is exploited
by groups antithetical to U.S. interests, and the potential for any South American state to
threaten U.S. citizens and seriously undermine U.S. security is almost non-existent.
Even if this were to occur, the level of disruption that the action would cause is likely to
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be limited because of the defensive systems that the U.S. military has in place, and the
lack of capacity in the state militaries of South American states.
Each section contains an assessment of the current situation in the region,
highlighting the potential security implications for the U.S. This is followed by an
overview of current U.S. military posture in or towards the region, which provides the
basis for the scenario analyses in the subsequent chapter.
East Asia and the Pacific
The Obama Administration's self-designated "pivot" to Asia indicates the
perceived importance of the region.91 Economics are part of the rationale behind this
strategic focus; states in Asia and the Pacific Rim were the recipient of twenty percent of
total exports from the U.S. in 2014.92

Despite a recent slowdown, the "Tiger

Economies" are still considered to have high potential for growth, and represent an
opportunity for U.S. businesses to tap into a market that could ultimately bolster the
economic standing of the U.S. Greater involvement in the economies of the region could
also be considered to be the leveraging of soft power, and a method of preventing them
from becoming further intertwined with the Chinese economy.
China's first deployment as part of a UN peacekeeping force occurred in 2015,
and 1,031 personnel, including infantrymen, medics and engineers, are stationed in
South Sudan, suggesting that Chinese policy makers are aware of the benefits of working
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within international institutions.93 Nevertheless, China's actions in the global arena do
not suggest that the state's policy makers are intending to usurp and replace the U.S.
However, while it may not have surpassed the U.S. by any single metric of strength, the
rise of China as an economic and military power has weakened the relative international
position of U.S., thereby increasing the challenge that U.S. policy makers face in
ensuring that their state remains the global leader.
Discerning the grand strategy and long term goals of China's policy makers is
difficult. Nevertheless, Mearsheimer suggests that it is inevitable that there will be a
clash between China and the U.S. and the potential for this to occur has increased due to
Chinese expansionism and aggression in the South China Sea.94 This has been
manifested through attempts to claim the Spratly island chain as Chinese territory. Some
750 miles from mainland China, there is little legal justification for these claims and the
deployment of military vessels and troops has heightened concerns in the region.95 This
has been exacerbated by the Chinese policy of creating new islands, which are then
claimed as Chinese territory.
The Chinese military is also improving. Numerically powerful, the force is being
equipped with increasingly sophisticated weaponry. The lack of an aircraft carrier had
hobbled the relative capability of Chinese forces to engage in combat in the South China
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Sea but, with the first Chinese-built carrier due to be commissioned before 2020, the
situation is changing.96 Although the Chinese military can theoretically hold targets at
risk across the South China Sea by using missile systems based in mainland China, the
aircraft carrier provides additional flexibility in power projection, facilitating the use of
medium range strike aircraft against targets that they may otherwise have been unable to
reach without refuelling, as well as extending the boundaries of the Chinese A2AD
network.
The Chinese Air Force is also able to field aircraft that are modelled on the
technology used by the Russian and U.S. militaries. The state has also committed to
upgrading its LRSB fleet, although details of the expected capability of the system and
its intended delivery date remain scant.97 In addition, the Chinese military fields an
advanced A2AD network. These hardware improvements run in tandem with the strong
cyber capability that is available to Chinese policy makers. While it is difficult to
apportion state responsibility for acts of aggression that occur in cyberspace, it seems
apparent that the Chinese government has at least tacitly supported efforts by its citizens
to disrupt U.S. activities through cyber attacks, notably the hack in 2015 of a database of
DoD employees' details.98
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Chinese forces cannot yet engage with the U.S. military on equal terms, but the
capability gap is closing and the state represents a threat to U.S. security. This is
particularly the case with regards to naval power. The Chinese military gaining the
ability to deny the U.S. Navy access to the South China Sea would be a considerable
impediment to U.S. policy makers' efforts to balance against perceived Chinese
aggression in the region. Even without an aircraft carrier being added to the Chinese
fleet, the possibility of this situation occurring in the short- to medium-term is becoming
more plausible. In purely numerical terms, the Chinese Navy outnumbers the U.S. Navy
by around 300 ships, although 125 of these are inshore patrol craft. Notably, the Chinese
military has emphasised the ability to deliver large quantities of firepower from seaborne
platforms, with its frigate fleet outnumbering its U.S. counterpart by forty-eight vessels
to six while its total number of destroyers is, at thirty-two, half that of the U.S. Navy.99
The number of vessels in the Chinese Navy does not necessarily equate to
effectiveness in defeating the U.S. at sea. Nevertheless, "China can now hold the U.S.
Navy's surface fleet at risk at significant ranges from the mainland". 100 This capability is
not solely generated by the Chinese Navy's vessels, with land-launched missiles and
medium range strike aircraft also threatening U.S. ships. By 2017, the Chinese military
will have a slight advantage over the U.S. in anti-surface warfare in the initial stages of a
conflict that is restricted to the waters around Taiwan, particularly because of

99

Global Firepower, "Military power comparison results for United States of America vs. China,"
GlobalFirepower.com, accessed March 28, 2016, http://www.globalfirepower.com/countries-comparisondetail.asp?form=form&country1=United-States-ofAmerica&country2=China&Submit=Compare+Countries.
100

Eric Heginbothan et al., The U.S. - China Military Scorecard (Santa Monica: RAND Corporation,
2015), 198.

40

improvements in attack submarine technology.101

Over longer distances from the

Chinese mainland, such as a conflict around the Spratly Islands, there would still be
relative parity, but the direction of the trend in the relative power balance over the past
decade has been in favour of the Chinese Navy.102 Should a Chinese aircraft carrier be
deployed that carries fifth-generation fighter aircraft, the operational challenges facing
the U.S. military are likely to become even more acute.
Chinese growth represents an existential challenge to the U.S. perceptions of
global primacy and, particularly through the aggressive posture of the Chinese military
in the South China Sea, a threat to the U.S. ability to dominate a region militarily. By
closing the gap on the U.S. in any metric of economic and military power, China reduces
the ability of the U.S. to leverage soft or hard power in their sphere of influence.
Furthermore, this may induce other states to lose confidence in the ability or willingness
of the U.S. to provide effective support, or change perceptions that the U.S. is the
optimal international partner.
Chinese military strength is a particular challenge to U.S. global primacy. The
relative strength and capability of the two militaries means that a full-scale hot war
between the states is likely to lead to severe force degradation for both sides, regardless
of which achieves eventual military victory. Such loss of capability would affect the
ability of U.S. policy makers to wield influence in other regions. The posture of the
Chinese military in the South China Sea is also indicative of the challenge that is posed
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to the U.S. strategic position in the region. Should China be able to establish permanent
bases on the islands, it will provide launch-points for further military operations,
augmenting the existing threat to the U.S. military from Chinese long range missiles,
naval vessels and aircraft. This would again degrade the ability of the U.S. to wield
influence in the region, and the numerical advantage of the Chinese forces over other
state militaries in East Asia puts pressure on U.S. policy makers to commit to defending
its allies, rather than relying solely on the security strategy policy of assisting in their
development of military capability.
The existing bilateral security relationships between the U.S. and other states in
the region also affect U.S. security. Unless it is willing to breach its formal agreements,
which seems unlikely given the emphasis that U.S. policy makers have placed on
supporting the state's allies, the U.S. military is obliged to come to the aid of allied states
if they are under threat. Consequently, Chinese provocation and actions that are directed
at other states in the region, notably the Philippines, may force the U.S. to deploy its
military even if the strategic situation is not necessarily conducive to their success.103
North Korea also represents a threat to U.S. security and to the security of the
U.S.'s allies in East Asia and the Pacific. North Korean policy makers have seemingly
little regard for international conventions, particularly concerning nuclear missiles.
"Supreme Leader" Kim Jong-un's statement on the 1st of January 2016 re-iterated the
position that the North Korean military would "respond" to aggression and did not intend
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to instigate conflict.104 Nevertheless, the "nuclear readiness" ordered by Kim Jong Un in
response to sanctions proposed by the U.S. in March, 2016 suggests that the North
Korean leadership's interpretation of a proportionate response to aggression, as well as
its definition of an aggressive act, may differ from that of Western states.105
In a comparison of military capability, North Korea is comprehensively
outgunned by U.S. forces in numerical and technological terms. However, the proximity
of North Korea to allies of the U.S., notably South Korea and Japan, significantly
increases the threat that they represent. The North Korean military has the capability to
cause widespread damage in Seoul, the capital of a state with whom the U.S. has a
bilateral collective defence agreement, through the use of conventional artillery and short
range missiles.106 These strikes could be conducted with little prior warning, limiting the
time-frame available to act preventatively. This threat is further heightened by North
Korean efforts to develop a viable delivery system for their nuclear material, which
could cause an even greater degree of damage.
Having pledged support to South Korea and consistently voiced opposition to
North Korea's military posture, were the U.S. military not to intervene should a conflict
between the two nations escalate it would represent a lack of willingness to support

104

The National Committee on North Korea, "Kim Jong Un's 2016 New Year Address," NCNK.org,
January 2, 2016, accessed February 2, 2016, http://www.ncnk.org/resources/news-items/kim-jong-unsspeeches-and-public-statements-1/kim-jong-uns-2016-new-year-address.
105

BBC News, "North Korean leader urges nuclear readiness," BBC.com, March 4, 2016, accessed March
5, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35723070.
106

Jeremy Bender, "Here's the kind of damage North Korea could do if it went to war,"
BusinessInsider.com, August 26, 2015, accessed March 29, 2016,
http://www.businessinsider.com/damage-north-korea-could-do-if-it-went-to-war-2015-8.

43

allied states and "lead with purpose".107 As noted by numerous theorists, it is the
willingness of a state to use power, rather than merely its presence, that deters or coerces
other states into action.108 Consequently, if U.S. policy makers do not act or withdraw
U.S. forces from the region, thereby allowing North Korea to position itself aggressively,
they may lose the ability to wield influence in other regions.
The Middle East
While U.S. ground troops are not actively engaged in combat in the Middle East,
around 14,000 remain in Afghanistan and Iraq in a consultancy and training role.109 In
addition, U.S. aircraft are partners in coalition ground attack and ISR missions against
the so-called 'Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant' (ISIL). Militant organisations, both
local and transnational, are disrupting peace and stability, notably in Iraq, Syria,
Afghanistan and Yemen.
The Middle East has become a breeding-ground for terrorist organisations and
non-state militias, with the sectarian schism between Sunni and Shi'ite Muslims
becoming wider and more fractious. Consequently, in order to maintain true to the
intention stated in the 2015 National Security Strategy to "combat the persistent threat of
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terrorism", U.S. policy makers must retain a degree of involvement in the region.110 In
Afghanistan, the initial coalition invasion in 2001 removed the Taliban from power and
saw the installation of a democratically elected government.

This government is,

however, now coming under pressure from militant Islamic organisations looking to reassert control.

The rise of ISIL is also indicative of the lack of strong central

governments and committed military in Iraq and Syria and demonstrates the power of
non-state actors in shaping national and international security.
The collapse of nation states in the Middle East would be a severe blow to U.S.
policy makers' efforts to maintain the Westphalian system across the globe. This is made
more acute by the anti-U.S. sentiment in the region. ISIL and the Taliban both have
more parochial concerns than al-Qaeda, but ISIL has demonstrated a willingness to
attack the U.S. and its allies if there is an opportunity. 111 If these organisations are able
to become permanent fixtures in the political landscape of the Middle East, it will be
more difficult for the U.S. to influence the policy makers in the region, and increases the
ability of Islamic terrorist organisations to plan an attack on the U.S.
Iran's political and military posture also represents a threat to the security of the
U.S. and its allies. Some of this threat will be mitigated if the agreements made within
the nuclear deal of 2015 are adhered to as the threat of nuclear strike by the state will be
significantly reduced. However, Iranian policy makers' continued hostility towards the
U.S. and Israel means that the threat to U.S. security remains. While not a direct threat
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from Iran, the state's alleged support for transnational terrorist organisations who are
engaged in activities against the U.S. or its allies further undermines U.S. security.
The adherence of Iranian policy makers to Shia Islam also puts the state in
conflict with some of the U.S.'s most important allies in the region, notably Saudi Arabia
and Qatar. If the Iranian posture becomes more aggressive, the U.S. military may be
required to assist in coercing Iranian policy-makers into changing their posture. This
could pull the U.S. into a conflict with a state that, while not a near-peer competitor, has
reasonable technological and numerical military strength. Given the delicate nature of
the sectarian tension in the region, conflict with Iran, particularly if U.S. forces are
supported by militaries from Sunni states, may result in a flare-up of sectarian violence.
If Iran is able to develop a nuclear weapon, enormous damage would be inflicted on the
U.S.'s allies in the region should deterrence fail and the weapon be launched.
The alliance between the U.S. and Israel also adds to the complexity of the
situation in the Middle East. Israel's continued conflict with Palestine, and their very
existence in the region, causes tension with other states. This is particularly acute in
Iran, with Israel being named by Ayatollah Khomeini as the "Little Satan", to the "Great
Satan" that is the U.S.112 However, the stated desire of U.S. policy makers to support
democracy, the historic ties between the U.S. and Israel, and the strategically significant
geographic location of Israel in supporting U.S. intelligence and military activity in the
region, increases the importance of ensuring the state's security. President Obama has
taken a less indulgent approach towards Israel than previous Presidents. Nevertheless,
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even with Prime Minister Netanyahu's belligerent stance on foreign and domestic policy
in the face of international pressure, U.S. strategy remains wedded to supporting Israel.
Consequently, were Israel to be attacked by another state it seems likely that the U.S.
would provide material assistance to augment the aid that is already being supplied, even
if the direct threat to "vital" U.S. national security interests limited.113
The security situation in the Middle East impacts U.S. security more deeply than
simply the increased potential for attacks occurring against U.S. citizens if terrorist
organisations are able to base their operations in the region. U.S. military action in the
region since 2001, as well as the U.S.'s network of alliances, has bound the state to the
Middle East. Withdrawing all support for the Iraqi and Afghan governments, and failing
to contribute to the coalition attacks on ISIL, would not only represent a break from the
emphasis on preventing terrorism outlined in the 2015 National Security Strategy but
would also be tantamount to an admission of failure, and thus an acknowledgement of
the inadequacy or unwillingness of the U.S. military to provide protection to allied states.
Furthermore, in 2015 the U.S. imported approximately 550 million barrels of oil
from the Persian Gulf and the oil trade has shaped the approach of U.S. policy makers to
the region since the middle of the twentieth century.114 The depth of this relationship
and the ongoing oil requirements of the U.S. social and business complexes means that
this facet of the relationship is likely to remain on the U.S. foreign policy agenda in the
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short to medium term at least. However, the advancement in extraction techniques
means that shale gas reserves and previously inaccessible oil deposits can be accessed by
U.S. oil companies and it is not inconceivable that the U.S. will be energy independent
before 2030.115 Although in this circumstance U.S. policy makers may believe it to be
politically expedient to continue to import oil from the region even if energy production
in the U.S. is sufficient to meet domestic requirements, the dynamic of the relationship
with oil-producing states in the Middle East would change and the incentive for U.S.
policy makers to be involved in a regional conflict, particularly if this would require
deploying U.S. troops on the ground, would be reduced.
Although U.S. policy makers have remained consistently averse to re-inserting
U.S. combat troops on the ground in the Middle East since their withdrawal in 2010, a
change may be forced in this policy if the U.S.'s allies come under sustained pressure
from state or non-state militaries. Even without committing ground forces, it seems
likely that U.S. aircraft will be required in the region in order to degrade the capabilities
of non-state militias and prevent terrorist organisations that threaten U.S. security from
operating openly. In addition, the lack of U.S. forces acting in combat roles on the
ground in the Middle East does not mean that there will not be a military presence. In
order to maintain the ability to respond rapidly to emerging situations, and demonstrate
continued support to allies in the Middle East, it seems likely that the U.S. military will
retain overseas bases in the region.
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The Russian Sphere of Influence
Under President Putin, Russia has taken an aggressive foreign policy stance. The
state has intervened in the civil war that erupted in Ukraine on a covert basis, and
formally provided aerial assistance to President Assad's forces in Syria. In addition,
Russian policy makers have pressed the claims of the state to control regions of the
Arctic, deploying anti-aircraft missiles and other military assets to bases on Kotelny
Island and in Alexandra Land. Russia's mistrust of the U.S. is epitomised by their
identification of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the U.S. as a
"threat".116 This also adds to the requirement for sensitivity in interactions with Russia
to avoid a situation escalating into military conflict.
The increasing Russian involvement in global affairs represents a direct challenge
to U.S. primacy. In particular, the deployment of Russian combat aircraft in Syria
changed the dynamic of U.S. military action in the region, requiring senior U.S. Air
Force personnel to meet with their Russian counterparts in order to co-ordinate their
efforts, and Royal Air Force combat aircraft operating in the theatre were equipped with
air-to-air missiles.117

Russian policy makers' belligerent stance in the Arctic is

manifested in the deployment of troops and military equipment to Northern Russia,
conducting more frequent military manoeuvres in the region, and continuing to claim
that the Siberian and Eurasian continental shelves that are accepted as Russian territory
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extend to the North Pole.118 These activities threaten the access of U.S. civilian and
military vessels to the region, and by extension challenge U.S. primacy and the state's
ability to provide military support for its allies in the Arctic Council. Consequently,
unless U.S. policy makers are prepared to accept this weaker position and loss of face on
the international stage, an action which would potentially undermine U.S. attempts to
demonstrate global leadership, political manoeuvres are required to coerce Russian
policy makers into modifying their approach to the region and deter them from similar
action in the future.
The spectrum of possible diplomatic approaches to resolving this conflict is
broad. Using the legal channels of international organisations to block Russian claims to
extend their territorial rights in the region, or threatening the imposition of sanctions,
could cause a change in Russian policy. Nevertheless, if such peaceful approaches are
unsuccessful, engaging in limited kinetic attacks against Russian forces in the region to
signal the capability and intent to protect access to what U.S. policy makers perceive to
be global commons remains an option.
By remaining passive and not showing the "vigorous" leadership to which U.S.
policy makers have committed, it suggests that they are not prepared to risk a conflict
with a state that, while it may not be a near-peer competitor with regards to economic
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strength, has a sizeable and capable military.119 The potential for the Russian military to
engage in an aggressive action that would give NATO member states little choice but to
honour their commitment to collective action is limited because of the likelihood of a
military defeat for the Russian forces. However, this does not mean that Russia cannot
or will not push the boundaries of international law, as appears to have been the case in
the involvement of Russian troops in Ukraine. This presents U.S. policy makers with the
challenge of trying to act in a manner that retains the support of the international
community while maintaining a posture that prevents Russia from increasing its power
by reference to the U.S. Even if Russian forces do not prosecute direct strikes against
the U.S. or its allies, the redeployment of Russian troops to strategically important
locations from which kinetic attacks can be launched against the U.S. or its allies can be
seen to be solidifying their position, putting the U.S. at a disadvantage. As with a hot
war against Chinese forces, although the U.S. military are likely to ultimately vanquish
their Russian counterparts, the capability of the Russian military is such that the U.S.
forces would suffer significant losses during the conflict.
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Chapter Four: Scenario Analyses

The scenario analyses below explore the intended role and likely effectiveness of
the B-21 across a range of possible conflict environments, informed by the strategic
challenges of the previous chapter. The B-21 is due to enter service in 2025 and the
scenarios represent events occurring after the system becomes operational. However,
given the turbulence of the global security situation, anticipating the situation in more
than a decade's time with any degree of exactitude is difficult. As a result, there are two
key assumptions made in the construction of the scenarios:
1. Any actions taken by the belligerents in the period between 2015 and the scenario
occurring will follow the trends that were extant in 2015.
2. Any commitments to military spending or definitive actions that had been due by 2025
are assumed to have been completed on schedule, otherwise military strength will be
assumed to remain at its 2015 level.
The study could be expanded through additional scenarios, and the identification
of the areas of greatest threat to the U.S. can be debated. However, the scenarios
analysed also represent a spectrum of types of conflict in which U.S. forces may be
engaged, facilitating a thematic consideration of the tactical and strategic challenges that
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the U.S. military, and in particular the B-21, may face in the coming decade.

The

efficacy of the military in acting as a deterrent is difficult to quantify, and by definition
the realisation of any security threat indicates that deterrence has failed. Each of the
hypothetical scenarios outlined are intended to be a backdrop against which the efficacy
of U.S. military systems can be assessed and, while the potential deterrent effect of U.S.
forces will be considered, this represents a secondary aspect of the analysis.
Hypothetical Scenario One: Countering Chinese Aggression in East Asia
Chinese policy makers continue to claim that the area contained within the 'NineDash Line' is Chinese sovereign territory. Their island-building programme has led to
territories populated by Chinese civilians and permanent military installations that
provide the first layer of the Chinese A2AD network. In addition, two of the islands
contain airstrips that house Chinese Chengdu J-20 fifth-generation multi-role fighter
aircraft.
The Chinese government has stated that any attempt to position military vessels
within the area bounded by the Nine-Dash Line would be met with kinetic force. The
U.S. military has been drawn into the emerging conflict through their regional alliances
and the Chinese response to attempts to manoeuvre military vessels and aircraft through
the waters that are claimed as part of Chinese territory. U.S. military aircraft have been
identified and locked by Chinese radar systems, as well as being intercepted and
chaperoned by Chinese military aircraft, while naval vessels have been similarly tracked
by Chinese radar systems and shadowed by Chinese naval and aerial assets at ranges of
up to 200 miles outside the Nine-Dash Line.
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Chinese policy makers' aggressive stance on the South China Sea has caused
concern among other states in the region and the situation has escalated with the launch
of an anti-aircraft missile at a South Korean Lockheed Martin F-35 'Lightning II' that had
entered the north-eastern portion of the territorial waters claimed by China. Under the
terms of the 1953 "Republic of Korea Treaty", following an "armed attack" on Korea, the
U.S. is obliged to "act to meet the common danger".120

Although this does not

necessarily require the U.S. military to deploy, pressure is being put on U.S. policy
makers to leverage military power against China in order to prevent them from gaining
full strategic domination of the South China Sea and deter any further aggressive actions.
Such action is likely to require missions being launched against the Chinese mainland as
well as against Chinese military forces deployed in the South China Sea.
Strategic considerations for U.S. military action
The purpose of the U.S. military engaging in this conflict is to demonstrate the
ability of the U.S. military to impose costs that Chinese policy-makers find intolerable,
thereby coercing a change in Chinese foreign policy. Ultimately, this policy change
must be long term, with Chinese policy makers convinced that further attempts to assert
dominance in the South China Sea will be unsuccessful. The situation in this scenario
has gone beyond the U.S. military acting as a deterrent; the Chinese forces have
deployed kinetic force within an area that only Chinese policy-makers recognises as its
sovereign territory. Instead, the U.S. forces are partaking in coercion.
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In order to achieve these goals, Chinese policy-makers must be convinced that
Chinese forces are incapable of preventing attacks by the U.S. military and that any
efforts by the Chinese forces to impose similar costs will not succeed. The U.S. force
structure that is best suited to completing this mission is a combination of naval and air
assets. Ground forces may be valuable in taking and holding the Spratly Islands to
prevent their use as bases for Chinese forces, but they will not provide the determining
factor of the conflict as a ground conflict on the Chinese mainland is not a viable military
option for the U.S.121
Despite the U.S.'s alliances within the region being the primary cause of the
military deployment, the role of these states in the conflict is restricted primarily to
providing bases from which the U.S. military can launch attacks, and demonstrating
resilience in the face of any Chinese attacks that penetrate their defensive networks.
There is little offensive military capacity among the U.S.'s allies in the region; while the
South Korean military is technologically strong, it is numerically limited and must
remain wary of North Korean policy makers exploiting any turbulence and attacking
South Korea, nominally in support of its Chinese ally. Similarly, while Australia has
capable military force, it lacks the ability to project force over long ranges and has
seemingly little desire for a direct military confrontation with China.

Japan has

committed to maintaining a defensive posture and only using force if Japan's survival is
at stake, all other non-military options have been exhausted, or other UN peacekeeping
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troops are under threat. Even in these cases, "the use of force is limited to the minimum
necessary to deter aggression".122
The imposition of costs on China is reliant on the realisation of an ability to
penetrate Chinese defensive systems and deliver ordnance against static and mobile
targets. Consequently, attacks are likely to be conducted by ground attack aircraft or
long range cruise missiles deployed from the ground or naval vessels. These strikes will
have the dual foci of degrading the Chinese military's defensive network, particularly the
A2AD capability, and preventing the deployment of hardware that could be used to
conduct counter-strikes against U.S. assets or allies. Chinese ground-launched cruise
missiles and ground attack aircraft represent the most severe threats to the security of the
U.S.'s allies. The DH-10 missile, which can be deployed from mobile launchers, has a
range of around 1,550 miles, rendering almost the entirety of the South and East China
seas, and the states with coastlines on these waters, vulnerable to attack. 123 Of symbolic
significance, if not also military, is removing Chinese presence from the Spratly Islands.
The military aircraft based there can both prevent the operation of U.S. forces and
conduct ground attack missions. Stopping these aircraft from performing either of these
roles is critical for the U.S. military's campaign. The likely deployment of a Chinese
aircraft carrier before 2025 provides an additional dimension to U.S. operations in the
region.124

Aircraft launched from the vessel provide an extension to the Chinese
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military's A2AD network, and could also threaten U.S. vessels and ground bases in the
region.
According to its proponents, this scenario should provide a template for the
leveraging of many of the assets that are unique to the B-21. Although the U.S. Global
Strike Command does not ordinarily permanently deploy its assets in the territories of
other states, the motto of the 8th Air Force includes the phrase "Global Strike on
Demand".125 LRSBs have deployed to the Pacific region and in December, 2015, there
was a diplomatic incident when two B-52s encroached on airspace over the Spratly
Islands that the Chinese government claimed to be their territory.126 Although this event
was explained as a navigational error, it also represented a reminder to the Chinese
forces of U.S. military capability in the region. However, the B-52 remains vulnerable to
technologically strong IADS, and in this scenario the key for the U.S. military is to
demonstrate efficacy in penetrating the Chinese A2AD network, rather than providing a
visible reminder of U.S. military assets whose real effectiveness is limited.
Role of the B-21
The B-21 has been described as "one of the centerpieces of the Asian Pivot",
providing a penetrative counterpoint to the growing technological sophistication of the
Chinese military.127 A strong A2AD network, and the ability to "project a large volume
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of precision firepower out roughly 2,000 kilometers from China’s coast", challenges the
"free movement of [U.S.] forces in the theater", an operational capability on which "the
success of any major operation or campaign depends".128 The Chinese missile-based
defensive system is augmented by land-based aircraft, potentially including those
deployed on man-made islands in the South China Sea to provide a further buffer against
attacks and, should its development be completed on schedule, fighter and strike aircraft
from an aircraft carrier. The B-21 is intended to provide penetrative capabilities, putting
strategic and tactical targets within this zone, particularly missile launch sites, at risk.
However, the strategic concept is fundamentally undermined by the inability of the
system to loiter within the area covered by the IADS. The B-21 will augment the
capability of U.S. military operations in the region but requires significant support if
missions that involve the system are to be effective.
The B-21 has three potential functions in this scenario: First, its presence can be
used as an indication of the U.S. military's strength and U.S. policy makers' willingness
to act. Its proposed capability, particularly with regard to its low observability, make the
system a greater threat than the B-52. Second, the system can be used to strike strategic
targets in order to coerce Chinese policy makers into renouncing their claim to the South
China Sea and deter any future hostile actions. Third, the system can be used to strike
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tactical targets in order to degrade Chinese military strength to the point at which it is no
longer able to threaten the activities of the U.S. military or its allies in the region.
The B-21 would, in particular, be required to strike missile launch sites; "hunting
mobile missiles" has been described as the system's "single most important mission".129
However, the likely effectiveness of the system in this role is questionable. LRSBs in
Iraq during the first Gulf War were unable to prevent Scud tactical ballistic missiles from
being deployed against coalition forces, despite the geographic circumstances being in
favour of the air campaign and a relative lack of an A2AD network.130 The generation of
land-based missiles that the Chinese military would deploy are solid-fuelled and "can be
erected and launched in under ten minutes".131 In addition, the range of these missiles
means that their launch positions can be in a variety of locations and in "complex" terrain
without jeopardising their effectiveness.132 In order to prevent these missile launches,
the U.S. Air Force would have to maintain constant coverage over a broad swath of
Chinese territory. Low observability does not equate to invisibility. The most advanced
radar systems in 2016 rendered the B-2 detectable and, although the performance of the
B-21 will not be known until its design is at a greater level of maturity, it cannot be
assumed that it would be able to operate entirely undetected within a sophisticated
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IADS.133 Unless the aircraft demonstrates a degree of survivability, the design of which
is antithetical to optimising the low observable properties of the system, the detection of
the B-21 is likely to lead to its destruction if no further protection is provided.
Furthermore, daylight renders the system visible to the naked eye, regardless of its low
observable properties, thus reducing the time that a fleet of B-21s can remain in Chinese
airspace undetected and limiting the system's effectiveness.134
The suggestion that the system will ensure "the unique capacity of the U.S. to
intervene anywhere, anytime, with decisive military force" on a unilateral basis is proven
to be misleading in this scenario.135 If the B-21 is to be effective, the U.S. Air Force
requires the ability to operate from bases in the region. In order to reach the Chinese
mainland and return in a single flight, the system would require air-to-air refuelling. It
would be possible to launch and recover the B-21 from Guam to strike a target in
mainland China, and not rely on air-to-air refuelling. However, Anderson Air Force
Base is within range of the Chinese DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile, which has
been dubbed the 'Guam Killer', greatly increasing the risk of maintaining a campaign
from that location alone.136 Although it is technically possible for a series of tanker
aircraft to provide the requisite support for the operation after launching from Hawaii
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and the mainland U.S., the logistical challenges of doing so for the duration of a longterm campaign are monumental: a single B-21 launched from Hawaii would require the
support of at least three refuelling aircraft to conduct a single strike on China, and four
would be required if the aircraft were to launch from the mainland U.S.137 Instead,
LRSB operations launching from the U.S. would rely on support from tankers that are
based in multiple locations in the region. The centrality of the refuelling aircraft to the
success of any U.S. LRSB mission necessitates maintaining the security of the aircraft
and the bases from which it is launching. To provide protection from Chinese fighter
aircraft, the tankers need to be supported by similar systems. This necessitates the
presence of U.S. fighter wings in the region, either in air bases on land in allied states or
from aircraft carriers.
Accepting the requirement for these bases facilitates the potential forward
deployment of the B-21, providing operational flexibility. However, the presence of
these airfields also facilitates the deployment of medium range strike aircraft that can
prosecute interdiction missions against targets in mainland China, Chinese-held islands,
and provide opposition to the Chinese Navy. The F-35 has a range of around 1,200
miles, putting mainland China comfortably in range of systems based in Okinawa or
South Korea.138 There is undoubtedly a political risk from deploying the aircraft in these
locations, but this is not dissimilar to the risk of deploying refuelling aircraft to the same
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bases. There is, of course, a qualitative difference between tanker and strike aircraft, a
difference that has been noted by the Australian government in their reluctance to allow
U.S. LRSBs to be permanently stationed in Australian territory.139
difference should not be overestimated.

However, this

If the tanker aircraft are not permanently

deployed at these bases in East Asia, then their transfer to those locations potentially
indicates that a strike is being planned, even if the aircraft that would deploy the
ordnance are not based alongside them. This may, therefore, make these base locations a
primary target of the Chinese A2AD network.
The capability of medium range strike aircraft to prosecute a strike mission
further undermines the requirement for the B-21 in this scenario. The function of any
ground attack aircraft is to deploy ordnance against a target; the aircraft itself is simply a
delivery mechanism and the capability of the ordnance is of at least equal importance in
defining the effectiveness of a mission.140 Unless the A2AD network has been degraded
to the point that the LRSB can loiter unsupported within Chinese airspace, strike
missions are only going to be effective against static targets. Such targets could include
air bases, permanent radar sites, communications hubs, or missile silos. Consequently,
unless the U.S. develops a land-based equivalent of the LRASM that is able to identify
appropriate aim points autonomously, cruise missiles with programmable GPS / Inertial
Navigation Systems are likely to be the most effective ordnance.

It is to perform this
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role that the DoD is developing the new long range standoff cruise missile.141 The
existing AGM-158 JASSM-ER has a range of over 600 miles and a Circular Error
Probable (CEP) of less than five metres - comparable to a laser-designated Paveway
II.142 The upgrade is likely to extend this, mitigating the operational drawbacks of the
"short legs" of medium range strike aircraft.143 Regardless of whether the target is
strategic or tactical, except in cases where the GBU-57A/B is used, the ordnance
deployed by the B-21 or by medium range attack aircraft will be identical.
Deploying a stand-off air launched cruise missile minimises the time that the
deploying aircraft is required to spend within the Chinese A2AD network coverage and
is difficult to intercept before it reaches the target. The B-21 is not required to deliver
this ordnance. The low observable properties and the survivability of the F-35 make it
possible to launch the aircraft from an overseas base, such as Okinawa, and manoeuvre
into an appropriate position to deploy the missile. The obvious drawback of using the F35 rather than the B-21 is its reduced carrying capacity. Eight F-35s are required to
deploy the same number of AGM-158 JASSM-ERs as a single B-2.144 However, this is
balanced by the reduction in the risk of total operational failure that is achieved by
separating the locations of missile deployment.

In addition, in the event of detection
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and interception, either pre or post missile deployment, the F-35 is likely to have a
greater degree of survivability than the B-21.145
The B-21 has also been proposed as contributing to the naval conflict in this
scenario.146 There is no reason why the system could not deploy air-to-sea missiles,
notably the LRASM, and the loiter capability would potentially facilitate ISR missions.
However, the effectiveness of the system in this role is likely to be surpassed by
alternative U.S. military technologies acting in concert. Again, not retaining the use of
bases in allied states in the region nullifies the potential for the system to loiter in the
battlespace, thereby reducing its effectiveness in an ISR role. If these bases exist there
seems little reason not to use a variant of the General Atomics MQ-1 'Predator', the ISRbased precursor of the MQ-9, or a similar HALE RPA. Although the currently fielded
systems are vulnerable if operating in a contested air environment, they can carry
advanced ISR equipment, have "long-endurance" capability and, with the MQ-9 and
MQ-1 having a unit cost of around $20m and no aircrew on board, are more expendable
than the B-21.147 The MQ-1 can remain airborne without refuelling for over eighteen
hours, and this is likely to be extended in future versions of the aircraft as the air-to-air
refuelling capability of unmanned systems evolves.148 General Atomics' Lynx Multi-
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mode Radar suite can be operated in "Maritime Wide Search Area" mode and provides
"photographic quality" video imagery in all weathers at ranges of up to fifty miles.149
This is comparable to the Recon/Optical CA-295 camera used in the Raytheon Technical
Services Company SHARP, the ISR system carried by the Lockheed-Martin P-3 "Orion"
maritime surveillance aircraft.150
In an anti-shipping role, the only advantage of the B-21 over alternative systems
is its carrying capacity and potential for a single aircraft to launch multiple attacks in a
single mission. However, a fleet of medium range strike aircraft launched from land
bases in the region or aircraft carriers would be capable of delivering large volumes of
firepower. Consequently, although adding the B-21 to this sector of the conflict would
augment the ability of U.S. aircraft to disrupt Chinese naval activities, a greater increase
in the effectiveness of the U.S. military would be achieved through the deployment of
remotely piloted aircraft, and a co-ordinated campaign founded on medium range multirole fighter aircraft operating alongside the U.S. Navy's attack vessels. Land-based
medium range strike aircraft would be able to hold vessels at risk in strategically
important regions of the South China Sea from a base in the Philippines, and the East
China Sea is comfortably within the combat radius of aircraft launched from South
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Korea or Okinawa. Consequently, fears that without the B-21 the U.S. military in this
scenario would be reliant on an aircraft carrier are misplaced.151
Procuring the B-21 is not a prerequisite in demonstrating the military dominance
of U.S. forces in the South and East China Seas. Using the B-21 to prevent the Chinese
military from deploying mobile missile launchers is unlikely to be effective, even if the
system was able to penetrate the Chinese A2AD network. Furthermore, the effective
operation of the B-21 in this environment is reliant on its low observability alone, rather
than survivability in the event of detection. This operating capability is not guaranteed
going forward. The ultimate aim of a ground attack mission is to deploy ordnance
against a target. In this scenario, the loiter capability of the system cannot be fully
exploited due to the strength of the Chinese IADS and A2AD network. Consequently, it
is only static targets that can be consistently held at risk, and can be struck precisely with
missiles pre-loaded with the target's location. The B-21 is not the only aerial system
capable of attaining a position from which such ordnance can be deployed.
Hypothetical Scenario Two: Defeating ISIL in the Middle East
ISIL has defied the expectations of military strategists and the core of the
organisation has survived attacks from state forces, including the air campaigns of the
U.S. and Russia. However, they have been contained in a limited geographic region in
northern Iraq and Syria. Although large-scale and lasting advances are no longer a
central component of their campaign, limited and localised attacks remain a frequent
feature of the conflict. ISIL are increasingly encouraging overseas attacks on civilians in
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states that have conducted action against them. The U.S. intelligence services have
indicated that attacks on the U.S. homeland are imminent.
Although not under imminent threat of collapse, the government of Iraq remains
unable to command total control of the state's security, with sectarian violence a constant
catalyst of conflict. The Afghan government has been forced to relinquish control of the
south of the country, with the Taliban the de facto authority in the region. Protests
against governments in the Arabian Peninsula have continued sporadically but have had
little effect in altering the political status quo. Saudi Arabia and Qatar remain allies of
the U.S. and the U.S. military has permanent bases in both states. President Assad's
Syrian government retains control of Damascus, Homs and Aleppo but the remainder of
the country is riven by militant groups vying for primacy, with no rebel organisation
having the strength to irremediably defeat the government forces. U.S. policy makers
remain reluctant to commit to providing overt military support to any group.
Strategic considerations for U.S. military action
According to the 2015 National Security Strategy, conducting counterterrorism
operations is one of the key roles of the U.S. military. 152 ISIL's existence threatens U.S.
security directly, through potential attacks on the U.S. homeland, and also threatens
states that are allied to the U.S. In addition, the U.S. has retained a degree of influence in
the region and consistently played an active role in its security through links with state
militaries even after combat troops were removed from the region, a function of the
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U.S.'s security strategy to build up allies' capabilities, and U.S. aircraft performed
intelligence-gathering and ground attack roles in ground operations against ISIL.
By increasing the direct threat to the security of the U.S., ISIL puts U.S. policy
makers under pressure to act, in particular to engage in a campaign that causes the
collapse of the group. The desire of U.S. policy makers to avoid unilateral action, as
well as the experience of U.S. forces in Afghanistan and Iraq in the first decade of the
twentieth century, means that U.S. military action is likely to be as part of a coalition.
The universal condemnation of ISIL's actions, and the level of threat that they pose to the
security of other states, means that engendering some level of support for action is
probable. U.N. Resolution 2249 (2015), which calls on member states with the requisite
capacity to take “all necessary measures” to prevent and suppress ISIL campaigns,
further legitimises U.S. action in the region.153 However, the U.S. military has greater
strength than those of its likely partner nations. Consequently, in real terms the U.S.
forces are likely to bear the greatest burden.
The ultimate intention of the action is to allow space for achieving the long-term
goal of reducing the propensity for violent extremism to be fomented in the region.
However, although the "battle for hearts and minds" is unlikely to be achieved through
military action alone, stabilising the security situation is the critical first step. 154 If
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terrorist organisations have the scope of capability to operate unchallenged and engage in
recruitment activities, the battle is made more difficult to win. Consequently, ISIL must
be comprehensively defeated, rather than simply contained. To accomplish this, ISIL
leadership must be removed and the fighting capacity of the organisation degraded
completely, rendering them unable to engage in military action in the Middle East.
ISIL's narrative also requires their continued action and a demonstration of forward
momentum. If ISIL becomes irrelevant and impotent, recruitment is more difficult. This
is made more acute if the organisation is becoming demonstrably weaker and unable to
provide basic services for its members. It has been suggested that ISIL's strategy is to
draw western nations into another costly and lengthy campaign in the Middle East,
believing that such action would ultimately strengthen their cause.155 However, this
strategy is based on the assumption that ISIL's military will resist a sustained campaign
against them by a technologically advanced and numerically superior force. If the
organisation is perceived to be under intolerable pressure and on the point of collapse,
recruiting further support will be difficult.
Nevertheless, it is important that a concerted military effort against ISIL is
concluded quickly. A lengthy conflict potentially provides ISIL with greater recruitment
opportunities, and may also reduce the will of the populations whose militaries are
involved in the conflict to support continued action. This would be exacerbated if an
ending to the conflict seemed distant and the perceived threat from ISIL actions to
civilians outside the Middle East was reduced. The failure of coalition air strikes to
impose cataclysmic costs on ISIL following the group's emergence in 2014 indicates that
155
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a ground operation is required to engender its ultimate defeat.156 The assertion that,
regardless of their strike capability, military aircraft are unable to hold territory is
regularly levelled at strategists who have claimed that air power alone is capable of
winning a conflict.157 In this case, the argument is valid. Aircraft can be used to conduct
targeted strikes on ISIL's leadership which, if successful, may fundamentally alter their
ability to operate as a united force. In isolation, however, this does not guarantee the
collapse of the organisation - although now fractured, both al-Qaeda and the Taliban
remain viable terrorist groups despite the deaths of their respective figureheads.
Similarly, ISIL's force structure makes it difficult to inflict catastrophic military losses.
Troops are dispersed, there is little heavy armour and few strategically critical static
locations. Consequently, engendering the irremediable defeat of the organisation as a
unified and military force requires the commitment of ground troops.

In previous

engagements, particularly in Ramadi in 2015, a key tactic of ISIL was to leave small
pockets of troops or individuals to conduct harrying actions, attriting their opposition and
slowing their advance without scoring, or attempting to score, a broader victory.
Counteracting this requires a methodical and committed approach, accepting the
potential for losses but ensuring that each area cleared of ISIL forces is secured and
protected from counterattacks.
In addition, ISIL regularly operates within a civilian population and in urban
locations. Consequently, the potential for collateral damage is high and the requirement
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for precision is acute. This again reduces the likely efficacy of a campaign based solely
on air strikes. Even with the precision weapons currently deployed by the U.S. Air
Force, the blast radius is not insignificant. The 'Hellfire' missile, for example, the
ordnance most regularly deployed from RPA against high-value targets, uses semi-active
laser homing and has a CEP of between three and eight metres, with a blast and
fragmentation radius of between fifteen and twenty metres.158 Collateral damage in this
scenario has three potential outcomes.

First, the Western press cover conflicts in

increasing detail, and there is a strong moral disquiet around civilian casualties.159 This
can have a strong influence on the popular support for a conflict, reducing the scope of
operations that are deemed to represent an appropriate balance of risk and reward.
Second, ISIL thrive on popular support. Should the coalition of forces that are fighting
against them be perceived to have little regard for civilian life, the ability of ISIL to draw
in recruits increases.

Third, a lack of physical infrastructure and consequent low

standard of living can lead to dissatisfaction within society, one of the key drivers in the
emergence of militant groups who seek to alter the status quo. 160

Consequently,

regardless of the damage caused during the conflict, ensuring that at least basic services
are provided shortly after its conclusion is critical in ensuring that the civilian population
do not resent those who espouse to be their liberators. It is thus difficult to conceive of
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an air campaign in urban locations that, in isolation, is capable of both defeating the
adversary and minimising the impact of the conflict on civilians, a critical component of
the 'battle for hearts and minds'. This would be exacerbated by the promotion of the ISIL
narrative that a reliance on air strikes are a symbol of weakness and indicative of a
martial culture that lacks resolution and fortitude.161
Counteracting ISIL with military force also provides a signal to militant
organisations that the U.S. positioning of counterterrorism operations at the forefront of
national security strategy is more than rhetoric. The degree of threat that ISIL poses to
the U.S. way of life in the short term is debateable, but they undoubtedly represent one
of the most strategically significant extremist groups in existence, by virtue of their
profile and latent potential based on their relative economic and numerical strength.162
Consequently, by ignoring this threat, U.S. policy makers would undermine their
intended position as world leaders and renege on their commitment to counterterrorist
operations. This would be detrimental to engendering support for future operations by
reducing the faith of the policy makers of allied states that their U.S. counterparts would
remain true to their initial strategic goals. In addition, by acting against ISIL, it signals
to other groups with similar aims, particularly those who have an anti-U.S. stance, that
they will not be allowed to operate with freedom ad infinitum.

Furthermore, by

attacking ISIL, U.S. policy makers again demonstrate their commitment to upholding the
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Westphalian system. Although the intended outcome of the campaign would be to
increase the security of the U.S. population, this is founded on the goal of ensuring the
primacy of state governments in the Middle East and their ability to deal with non-state
actors. The presence of forces that act outside this framework as a matter of course
provide a dimension to international politics which the U.S. strategy and foreign policy
is not designed to accommodate.
It is also important to note the difficulty in conducting deterrence operations
against ISIL. The implications of this for the B-21 is that it will be used solely as a
weapon within a hot war environment, rather than being an escalatory tool that, through
its mere forward deployment or limited operations, could change the course of the
conflict.

The concept of deterrence is predicated on a common understanding of

rationality. When engaging with a rational actor, some estimation of the scope of the
costs that can be imposed may be estimated on the basis of shared understandings of
aims and relative strength. This assumption of rationality undermines the theory of
deterring non-state actors through the demonstration of power.163 ISIL's understanding of
costs and goals are fundamentally different, not least because their overarching aims are
perceived to be God-given.

Consequently, to demur from the activities that they

perceive to be theologically-ordained would be blasphemous, and there is no cost that
can be threatened that would outweigh this driver. In addition, ISIL presents a public
position that it is confident of its ultimate success in a conflict with the U.S. military and
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an international coalition.164 To back down from this rhetoric would be to cede control,
undermining their momentum and requiring a change in narrative that may not engender
popular support. Similarly, ISIL's bureaucracy and infrastructure is not part of a broad
international network and, as a result, sanctions are difficult to implement. Concerted
efforts to stop refineries from purchasing oil drilled in ISIL's territory may stunt the
organisation's funding, but is difficult to regulate and may not have a tangible impact for
some time.
Passive deterrence and demonstrating to ISIL the resilience of the U.S. social
order to ISIL's attacks is similarly unlikely to be efficacious unless there is a paradigm
shift in the rhetoric of U.S. politicians and media. President Obama's State of the Union
Address in January 2016 outlined the position that ISIL, while posing a limited threat to
the security of U.S. citizens through sporadic terrorist attacks, do not threaten the
political or social order of the U.S.165 However, this position was decried by right-wing
politicians and the associated media, with Senator Rubio stating that Obama
"consistently underestimated" the group.166 Given this interpretation of ISIL's threat,
deterring ISIL's attacks through demonstrating restraint in response is antithetical to the
U.S. government's priority of defending its citizens. In addition, given that goading the
U.S. public and policy makers is a theme of ISIL's propaganda and activities, it seems
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likely that a lack of U.S. response would be spun as a strategic success, making ISIL's
recruitment easier and increasing the pressure on U.S. policy makers to respond.
ISIL's forces are technologically limited in comparison with the U.S. military
and, in numerical terms, the U.S. military also has a strong advantage.

A bare

comparison of force capability based on numbers and hardware can, however, be
unhelpful, giving only a limited indication of effectiveness.

Nevertheless, it is

significant that ISIL lacks a sophisticated IADS, long range targeting and electronic
warfare equipment.

This highlights the long-term challenge for ISIL's military in

hampering the operations of U.S. forces. It would be naive to equate this to a simple
U.S. military victory - the history of irregular warfare has comprehensively demonstrated
the reverse. Nevertheless, the U.S. military technological capability is a fundamental
component of its effectiveness and ability to maximise its capacity.
The inability of ISIL to disrupt the U.S. military's electronic systems does not
guarantee U.S. victory. This is also prime example of a situation in which a dissuasion
strategy is unlikely to be efficacious: ISIL appear to be prepared to fight U.S. forces
regardless of their relative lack of capability and limited defence spending. ISIL's likely
avoidance of a conflict which pits their military against U.S. forces in a quasi-symmetric
fashion in the near term challenges the U.S. military's dominant operational capacity.167
In particular, ISIL are likely to operate in small groups, making it difficult for the U.S.
forces to inflict a decisive defeat. The lack of an obvious centre of gravity within ISIL
that can be easily attacked with kinetic force is typical of irregular conflict. The Vietnam
167
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conflict demonstrated the limits of the effectiveness of U.S. strike capability against an
irregular opponent.168 As a result, targets for the U.S. military are likely to be tactical,
requiring the precise delivery of ordnance, rather than ordnance designed for a strategic
strike against a fixed structure. In addition, as the conflict between ISIL forces and the
U.S. military develops, ground forces are likely to require support. Consequently, it is
likely that U.S. artillery and air strikes will be most regularly used to assist ground
operations, rather than being strategic independent attacks.
Role of the B-21
The likely fluidity of a hot war scenario involving U.S. ground forces and ISIL's
military, as well as ISIL's logistics and command structure, limits the number and value
of strategic targets. However, advances in targeting systems in the late 1990s has
enabled what were nominally strategic bombers to deploy precision-guided conventional
ordnance in a CAS role.169 U.S. B-52s and B-1Bs deployed the majority of air-to-ground
ordnance throughout Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.170
The two major attributes common to U.S. LRSBs that facilitate effective action in
CAS is the systems' ability to loiter and deploy a large volume of ordnance against
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numerous targets in a single sortie. This is, however, only effective if the air defence
systems of the opposition are incapable of challenging the loitering aircraft.
Consequently, although such an activity would be difficult to conduct against an
opposition military that has the technological capability of China, for example, this threat
has not been posed to the U.S. LRSB fleet operating in the Middle East. As a result, B1Bs and B-52s have been deployed over Afghanistan and Iraq and assigned to orbit in "a
block of grid-box engagement zones" until requested by a forward air controller when a
target has been identified and air strikes are required.171

A typical B-1B sortie in

Operation Enduring Freedom during its early years was described by aircrew as
containing strikes on around eighteen targets in multiple locations.172 The maximum
capacity to conduct strikes in this role is limited only by the quantity of payload carried
and pilot fatigue. Given that U.S. B-2 pilots have undertaken missions with flights in
excess of thirty hours, and the B-21 is likely to be able to undertake missions of a similar
length, a fleet of LRSBs can provide almost universal coverage of the battlespace in
which the bulk of the combat against ISIL's military would take place. 173 This allows
several controllers to task the aircraft during the same sortie, with satellite uplinks of
targets demonstrating the flexibility that the systems can provide.174

By way of

comparison, a "prolonged" mission conducted with an A-10 Thunderbolt, a system that
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was designed specifically for CAS missions and has a reputation for a high loiter time,
can, at its longest, last for four hours.175
This flexibility is further manifested in the variety of payload configurations and
quantity of lightweight 'smart' ordnance that LRSBs can deploy. Consequently, a range
of different targets can be attacked in a dynamic combat environment, with the LRSB
able to respond to circumstances that require strikes against heavy armour, tactical and
mobile targets or dug-in positions. During the six weeks of Operation Desert Storm,
coalition air forces struck 35,085 targets.176 Assuming that the B-21 is able to carry a
payload that equates roughly to the maximum payload of the B-2, and that thirty-five are
deployed on one sortie in theatre daily - around one third of the total number of systems
due to be held in the U.S. Air Force inventory - this would enable the LRSB fleet to
deploy 2,800 500lb GBU-31 bombs with JDAM guidance kit every twenty-four hours.
In one week, the B-21 fleet alone could deliver fifty-six percent of the total strikes
prosecuted in Operation Desert Storm, providing precise and timely support to ground
operations.177
Using ship- or land-launched missiles to perform a similar role is impractical due
to the cost of individual missiles and the difficulty of supplying such volume to maintain
a strike performance that would match that of an LRSB fleet. 178 Using the Raytheon
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"Tomahawk" as an example, long range cruise missiles with the precision that is required
for them to be used flexibly in support of ground operations are likely to cost in the
region of $1.8m per missile. By comparison, a Mk-84 dumb bomb with the JDAM
guidance package costs around $28,000.179 Although the explosive power is markedly
lower than the Tomahawk, it is adequate in most CAS missions. The largest missile
cruiser currently fielded, Russia's Admiral Nakhimov, can carry a maximum of eighty
cruise missiles and ninety-six anti-aircraft missiles.180 A single B-1B can carry twentyfour cruise missiles.181 Aside from the use of smaller ordnance, if the B-21 can carry a
similar number of cruise missiles as the B-1B and just fifteen aircraft are deployed in
support of anti-ISIL operations in the Middle East, the number of targets that can be
struck by the fleet without their being re-armed is more than twice the total number of
missiles, both cruise and anti-aircraft, carried by a dedicated missile cruiser.182
There is, however, a disconnect between the argument that the B-21 can be
stationed in the U.S. homeland and also convert its "long range" capability into "long
endurance" to loiter over the battlefield in Syria and Iraq. In both Operation Desert
Storm and Operation Enduring Freedom, LRSBs flew lengthy sorties, with B-2s
launching from Whiteman Air Force Base to strike Taliban targets and B-52s flying
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missions of over 14,000 nautical miles.183 Although the aircraft can be provided with
new targeting information en route, they were launching against static and pre-ordained
targets.

Pilot fatigue meant that once ordnance had been launched, they left the

battlespace without loitering and awaiting further targeting information. Unless the
LRSB is entirely remotely piloted–which seems unlikely–in order to exploit the long
endurance capability, the systems will have to launch from bases close to the theatre,
undermining the precept of the LRSB allowing U.S. policy makers to avoid relying on
overseas bases. In addition, to maximise its time over the battlespace, the LRSB requires
air-to-air refuelling.

This further increases the reliance on the policy makers of

neighbouring states continuing to be receptive to the U.S. Air Force operating from their
territory, and also that appropriate base security can be maintained.
One of the defining features of the B-21 is its low-observable characteristics. In
this scenario, however, this is likely to be redundant as ISIL do not have sophisticated
A2AD networks or Integrated Air Defence Systems (IADS). There is little need to
repeat the extreme caution at the commencement of Operation Enduring Freedom, which
saw B-2s being used to suppress what were believed to be anti-aircraft missiles capable
of successfully engaging non-stealthy aircraft.184 Any U.S. LRSB would be able to
operate with almost total impunity within the battlespace in this scenario. As such,
claims that the B-21 is a "cost-effective" method of delivering large quantities of
ordnance in unconventional warfare while being used in a CAS, interdictory, or
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battlespace preparation role are misguided.185 Compromises to range and payload will
have to be made in the airframe design if the aircraft is to have truly low-observable
characteristics. Consequently, greater cost efficiency would be attained were the system
to de designed to carry a large weight and range of ordnance, and deploy it accurately,
without regard for its observability.
If U.S. policy makers wanted to provide CAS and anticipated operating against
opposition with limited technological capability, it would be more appropriate to base a
new LRSB on the B-52 than the B-2. There is limited risk to the aircraft from the
opposition forces and the design focus would be on the critical attributes of endurance
and carrying capacity, rather than survivability.
The effective conduct of CAS and air interdiction from a loitering aircraft with no
low-observable properties has been demonstrated by the performance of the AC-130, a
Lockheed Martin C-130 "Hercules" that is modified by Boeing to contain an array of
ground attack equipment, notably heavy cannons.186 This is not a new concept, the
original modification of the Hercules to create a dedicated ground attack platform was
originally fielded in the early 1970s.187 The design has been refined and the aircraft's
performance was lauded for its effectiveness in Afghanistan and Iraq, indicating again
that low observability adds little, if any, effectiveness if the aircraft is used in a
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permissive air environment to conduct CAS, air interdiction or battlespace
preparedness.188
Alternatively, if the DoD required the ability to deploy heavier ordnance from the
aircraft, including cruise missiles, if the situation demanded, it is not inconceivable that a
modified version of a commercial aircraft, that has already been designed to maximise
haulage capability, could be used.

It is difficult to accurately predict the cost of

developing such an aircraft but studies undertaken at the U.S. Air University, Alabama,
in 1996 suggest that a Boeing 747-400 could be purchased and re-fitted with bomb
delivery mechanisms for just over $500m, after accounting for inflation.189 However, the
carrying capacity of a Boeing 747 variant is, at 248,600lb, more than three times that of
the B-1B.190 This would theoretically enable to aircraft to carry over one hundred cruise
missiles or multiple hundreds of smaller air-launched ordnance.191

In addition, its

endurance capability without air-to-air refuelling would be greater than the B-1B or the
B-2 but, at around 8,300 miles, approximately 500 miles shorter than the B-52.192 The
direct conversion of a Boeing 747 to a bomber is technically challenging, in part because
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of its low-wing structure destabilising the aircraft at the point of ordnance deployment.193
Nevertheless, considering the potential of the aircraft as a bomber provides an indication
of the relative lack of capability of the B-21 performing a CAS role in an uncontested air
environment against a long range strike aircraft that has been designed with this function
as its primary role.
It has been proposed that the B-21 will also perform an ISR role.194 In this
scenario, such capability would be beneficial, augmenting the capabilities of ground
forces. In addition, the LRSB would potentially be able to operate independently from
ground control and conduct strikes against targets of opportunity while loitering. This
would, however, again compromise the strike capacity of the system, requiring
additional hardware and, potentially, additional crewmembers to operate the ISR
equipment. The cost and endurance capability of the remotely piloted aircraft available
to the U.S. military, particularly the MQ-9 'Reaper', suggest that such a compromise is
unnecessary.195 Both systems can be fielded simultaneously as part of the broader
network of military operations, allowing the LRSB to leverage its maximum strike
capability. It is also more difficult to conduct stealthy ISR missions in daylight with an
LRSB; even without sophisticated detection systems, the aircraft is likely to be visible
when manoeuvring into an appropriate range from which to deploy its ISR sensors and
hardware.
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Despite the quantity of ordnance that the B-21 could deploy in a CAS role in this
scenario, two of the fundamental tenets of the system's proponents, its ability to strike
targets after launching from the U.S., and its penetrative capability, are redundant. The
long endurance capability of the B-21 can only become an effective attribute if the
system launches from bases close to its area of operations, thus creating the requirement
for the U.S. policy makers to maintain friendly relationships with the governing bodies
of states in the region. ISIL do not possess an IADS or A2AD network that is able to
defend against the B-1B or B-52 and further low observability features add little value to
the system's performance. The "dislocated authority" of ISIL's military and political
structure results in targeting and identification challenges for the U.S. military engaged
in operations against it.196 General Carlisle, one of the U.S. Air Force's "most ardent
champions of air power" conceded that ISIL will "never be defeated from the air". 197 Air
power provides unique ISR capability and potentially vital support to ground operations
in both strategic and tactical capacities. The lack of strategic targets in this scenario, as
well as the desire to avoid infrastructure damage, renders air power's strike capability
most effective when deployed in a CAS role or used to deploy ordnance against highvalue targets. The B-21, with its long endurance and payload flexibility, is capable of
CAS, but it is not optimised for performance in this capacity due to the emphasis on low
observability. Similarly, although the B-21 could be used to deliver the small, accurate
ordnance that is likely to be used against high-value targets, U.S. Army Colonel Steve
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Warren's assertion that the battlefield successes that Iraqi and Syrian forces have had
against ISIL in the past year is, at least in part, "attributable to the fact that the
organization is losing its leadership" because of Coalition air strikes; this role is currently
being performed more than adequately by MQ-9s and medium range strike aircraft.198
Deployment of B-21s in this scenario would undoubtedly improve U.S. military
capability, but it would represent a failure on the part of the U.S. military procurement
process to adequately foresee future challenges and provide appropriate equipment.
Hypothetical Scenario Three: Countering a Nuclear Iran
Iran has used the relaxation of sanctions to improve their economic position. In
addition, the nuclear deal agreed in 2015 has prevented comprehensive inspections of
Iranian nuclear facilities. Iran has exploited this lack of oversight to create a nuclear
warhead. Russian missile technology has been obtained by the Iranian military and they
have claimed the ability to launch a nuclear strike over inter-continental range within two
hours of the launch order being given.
Iran's increasing military and economic strength has encouraged Iranian policy
makers to take an aggressive foreign policy stance. Anti-Israeli rhetoric has been a
theme of public pronouncements by the Iranian government, alongside condemnation of
U.S. military and diplomatic involvement in the Middle East. Diplomatic relations
between Iran and Saudi Arabia deteriorated after the Shia cleric Nimr al-Nimr was
executed by the Saudi Arabian security forces in January 2016. 199

198

Iranian naval

Yeganeh Torbati and Walter Strobel, "U.S.-led air strikes kill IS leaders linked to Paris attacks,"
Reuters.com, December 29, 2015, accessed April 18, 2016, http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideastcrisis-islamicstate-strikes-idUSKBN0UC1B220151229.

85

commanders have also expressed their desire to attain a dominant position and control
shipping in the Persian Gulf. The Iranian military have deployed assets to the Strait of
Hormuz and Iranian policy-makers have re-iterated threats to close the strategically
critical body of water if any threat is made to Iranian security. The Iranian forces do not,
however, have technological parity with the U.S. military. Their IADS prevents most
U.S. aircraft from operating with total impunity but is vulnerable to being overwhelmed
by advanced electronic warfare and air-to-ground missiles with passive radar homing. In
addition, the Iranian Air Force operates only a limited number of air superiority fighter
aircraft. Iranian ground forces are also less well equipped than their U.S. counterparts,
lacking fifth-generation heavy armour and artillery. In a conventional conflict, they are
likely to provide little resistance to a concerted assault by U.S. forces.
Strategic considerations for U.S. military action
Iran's geographic location gives the state strategic significance and facilitates its
close interaction with neighbouring states. In purely military terms, this impacts the
dynamic of defending against an Iranian attack. A gradual build-up of Iranian forces is
likely to be noted by those that it is traditionally antithetical to, particularly given the ISR
capability of the U.S. and the continued military readiness of neighbouring states.
Nevertheless, a situation could escalate rapidly and an Iranian missile launch could leave
the state in which the target lies with little time to deploy countermeasures. In addition,
Iran has a geographically significant strategic position in controlling the Strait of
Hormuz, through which shipping, notably oil tankers, must pass in order to enter the
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Persian Gulf.200 This represents a potential economic stranglehold on Kuwait, Bahrain,
Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. In addition, if an adversary of Iran is able to
conduct naval operations in the Persian Gulf, it potentially provides the opportunity to
conduct sea-launched cruise missile strikes and aircraft carrier operations from close
proximity to Iranian territory. Unimpeded seaborne operations in the Persian Gulf by
anti-Iranian naval forces could also facilitate troop landings and, if an appropriate
logistical chain is created, resupply operations for ground forces operating on Iranian
soil.
An Iranian military that can deploy nuclear weapons increases the threat that it
poses to neighbouring states, and potentially provides Iranian policy makers with the
opportunity to cause catastrophic damage to allies of the U.S. in the Middle East.
Consequently, if the U.S. military is to be able to prevent the effective operation of
Iranian forces it must have the ability to respond quickly in the event of the rapid
escalation of a conflict, or the capacity to pre-empt an Iranian attack and degrade the
Iranian military, rendering them unable to provide meaningful opposition to U.S. forces.
The consequence, in the hypothetical scenario described above, of Iranian policy makers'
potential to launch a nuclear strike with limited prior warning in response to a perceived
or real threat to their existence is that an opposition force must be able to negate this
capability without giving the Iranian forces an indication of the imminence of the attack.
The short-term goal of U.S. military action against Iran in this hypothetical
scenario, whether it is used to deploy kinetic force or simply manoeuvres and re-
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positions, is to deter or coerce Iranian policy makers into stepping back from an
aggressive course of action. Long-term, it is to change the mindset of Iranian policy
makers, reducing the potential for Iranian military action against allies of the U.S. in the
Middle East. However, given the longevity and depth of anti-U.S., and particularly antiIsraeli, feeling in Iran, a fundamental change in opinion of these states and a radical reframing of Middle Eastern alliance structures is unlikely. As a result, a more realistic
approach is to engender a mindset amongst Iranian policy makers that the costs of
engaging in disruptive or aggressive action would exceed the potential gains.
A strategy that is reliant on the success of active deterrence is, in this scenario,
inherently risky. The line between the success and failure of deterrence is, by definition,
extremely slim. If the Iranian military do not deploy a nuclear weapon or launch a
conventional strike over its borders, the deterrence can be viewed as a success, albeit
other variables may influence Iranian policy makers. Conversely, any strike launched by
the Iranian military indicates that deterrence has failed; it is only after the event that the
strategy is proven to be ineffective. Signalling intent to Iranian policy makers is a
delicate balance and deterrence may fail as a result of either Iranian policy makers
doubting the willingness of their U.S. counterparts to order a kinetic attack, or their
belief that a U.S. strike is imminent and, consequently, they must act pre-emptively. The
temporal differentiation between the two sides of the theoretical line demarcating the
success or failure of deterrence is similarly narrow.
The actions of Iranian policy makers demonstrate a degree of rationality and an
appreciation of the cost-benefit dyad that is familiar to their U.S. counterparts, even if
88

their decisions are influenced by contextual factors that may not appear rational to U.S.
policy makers.201 The imposition of costs can be more effectively targeted against Iran
than against a non-state actor and the apparent success of sanctions in modifying the
actions of Iranian policy makers in the second decade of the twenty-first century is
indicative of this situation.
An Iranian nuclear first strike is likely to be "suicidal" for the regime and would
therefore be avoided by Iranian policy makers where possible.202 However, a strategic
nuclear weapon provides Iranian policy makers with a tool that could be used in response
to an attack on Iran. More importantly, it could also be used pre-emptively if Iranian
policy makers perceive their position to be under imminent threat from another state.
Relying on an active deterrence strategy that is based on threatening retaliation in the
event of an Iranian nuclear strike risks sacrificing a major city in a state that Iranian
policy makers believe to be planning to attack Iran; if Iran launches a strategic nuclear
weapon at an urban centre, regardless of the costs that could be imposed on the regime
following the manifestation of a failed deterrent strategy, the damage is likely to be
appalling. It is unlikely that U.S. policy makers or their partners in the region would be
willing to absorb this cost and rely solely on the threat of retaliation to prevent its
imposition.
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Passive deterrence based on a presumption of preventing a launched Iranian
nuclear weapon reaching its target is a similarly risky strategy in this scenario given its
destructive potential. Of Iran's neighbours who may be susceptible to a missile attack,
only Israel has the potential to be able to intercept the ordnance before it reaches its
target. Similarly, the short temporal period between a missile being launched in Iran and
reaching its target in the region is indicative of the danger and difficulty of attempting to
demonstrate the ability to adequately defend against a strike.
The destructive potential of an Iranian strategic nuclear weapon and the likely
reluctance of U.S. policy makers to risk its use means that a strategy based on preventing
its launch is more attractive than threatening the destruction of the state in the event that
the ordnance is deployed. Deterring Iranian policy makers from deploying a strategic
nuclear weapon therefore requires an active deterrence strategy that balances signalling
the intent and capability to prevent its launch, without risking an Iranian pre-emptive
attack that is founded on the belief that a strike on Iranian nuclear facilities is imminent.
The destruction of Iranian nuclear weapon facilities is likely to require a large
weight of ordnance. Even if the Iranian nuclear missile is not ultimately designed to be
silo-launched, it should be expected that its location prior to deployment is well
protected, both with IADS to prevent ordnance from reaching them, and construction
that mitigates the effect of any ordnance that is deployed. It was with the purpose of
striking underground and hardened static targets that the U.S. military procured the
GBU-57A/B Massive Ordnance Penetrator. Secretary of State John Kerry obliquely
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referred to the potential of these weapons when questioned about the options available to
U.S. policy makers were Iran to renege on the nuclear deal agreed in 2015. 203
The parlous state of Middle Eastern politics in the wake of the U.S.-led invasions
of Afghanistan and Iraq indicates the significance of post-conflict planning; the heated
debates within the DoD about responsibility for the reconstruction of Iraqi infrastructure
and subsequent creation of the Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and
Stabilization Department within the Department of State is an indication of the centrality
of this component in defining the ultimate success of military action. The U.S. military's
approach to conflict that puts a premium on civilian life should interlock with counterextremism strategies that are founded on the assumption that deprivation can spawn
radicalisation. The consequence of this is that collateral damage must be kept to a
minimum to maximise support for, or acceptance of, U.S. military action. This is
particularly the case if U.S. policy makers believed that simply removing Iran's nuclear
capabilities would not alter the state's disruptive and destabilising effect on the region in
the medium to long term and thus facilitating the smooth transition of power to a new
government would be an essential component in ensuring that the conflict ultimately has
positive consequences in the long term.
Further to maintaining infrastructure, it is important that any U.S. military action
taken against Iranian targets does not result in a power vacuum in Iran that can be
exploited by groups that have the potential to destabilise the region further. The key
decision for U.S. policy makers and any supporting coalition in this scenario is whether
203
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the existing Iranian government can be deterred or coerced away from threatening the
security of the U.S. or its allies through engendering an appreciation of the
ineffectiveness of Iranian forces. If this is not the case, the dynamic of the conflict is
altered dramatically and introduces the likely requirement for a ground force presence in
Iran to forcibly remove the Iranian government and oversee the transition of power.
Creating a coalition to counter the aggression of Iranian policy makers has
political as well as operational significance, and is made more challenging by the
generally low opinion of the U.S. in the region.204 Such an alliance would, in this
scenario, demonstrate that a state cannot operate outside the accepted international
system without risking extreme censure in the form of kinetic attack, again bolstering the
attempts of U.S. policy makers to maintain international institutions. However, in order
to demonstrate the global leadership that the U.S. policy makers have also espoused,
every effort needs to be made to engender near-universal support. Consequently, if the
intention of U.S. policy makers is to degrade Iran's military capability in order to deter
any acts of aggression, the blessing of international organisations such as the UN may be
required. By definition this stalls U.S. military action, potentially providing Iran with
the opportunity to launch their own attack before the U.S. military is turned onto Iranian
targets.
Role of the B-21
There are two key components to this conflict: first, Iranian policy makers'
capability to deploy a strategic nuclear weapon must be removed. Second, if a military
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campaign is to be prosecuted with the intention of forcing the capitulation of the Iranian
political regime, the capability of the Iranian military must be appreciably degraded. The
B-21 has unique attributes that could be critical in the successful prosecution of the
former mission, but it does not provide a unique effectiveness; the ordnance required to
prosecute these phases of the conflict successfully can be deployed by medium range
strike aircraft, or via long range cruise or ballistic missiles. Furthermore, the B-21's
contribution in the latter mission, particularly in a tactical role, requires protective
support to ensure the aircraft's survival, necessitating overseas basing for U.S. aircraft.
There is potential for the B-21 to be used as part of a deterrent strategy to prevent
aggressive action being instigated by Iranian policy makers and could demonstrate the
U.S.'s ability to conduct strikes on Iranian facilities. However, as will be discussed
below, the aircraft is unlikely to allow U.S. policy makers to bridge the gap between
signalling intent and capability without risking the pre-emptive launch of an Iranian
nuclear weapon.
While the USAF's General Carlisle may be correct in his assertion that "no single
tactical strike is going to change the war", denying the opposition the ability to deploy
their most destructive weapon radically alters the shape of the conflict.205

The

destruction of underground targets from the air can be difficult, requiring specialist
ordnance and precise targeting.206 Iran's nuclear facilities in this scenario, in particular
any nuclear missile silos, fall into this category of target. In the existing U.S. arsenal of
air-launched ordnance the GBU-57A/B is likely to be necessary if these targets are to be
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comprehensively degraded, and only the B-2 and B-52 are capable of carrying this
ordnance, with the B-21 likely to be added to this list.207 However, an air-launched
cruise missile with the same penetrative capability within a smaller casing is under
development, anticipated to be operational roughly simultaneously with the introduction
of the B-21.208 This ordnance is intended to be able to be carried by medium range strike
aircraft. In this scenario, however, if the U.S. intends to carry out a strike without using
the airspace of any state other than Iran or deploying an aircraft carrier, it will require the
ordnance to be developed in accordance with the proposed timeline and a delivery
system with greater range than a medium range strike aircraft.
If U.S. policy makers engender a coalition of states, including those in the Middle
East, to oppose Iranian action, it would facilitate the deployment of U.S. aircraft from
closer to Iran and potentially provide a greater range of mission routing options. This
would also provide U.S. policy makers with the opportunity to escalate the conflict prior
to committing to military action; the deployment of attack aircraft would be a
demonstration of capability and intent. If this fails to coerce Iranian policy makers away
from an aggressive course of action, the aircraft are in a position to conduct a strike more
rapidly than if they were required to launch from the U.S. U.S. policy makers could
order a strike on Iranian air defences without tying the raids to an attack on Iranian
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nuclear facilities and attempt to deter Iranian policy makers from further aggressive
behaviour by demonstrating the fallibility of their IADS and A2AD network. However,
there is a danger that such a strike is misconstrued as a precursor to a strike on the
nuclear facilities, rather than a distinct mission. As such, it could engender the preemptive launch of Iran's nuclear weapon.
The availability of bases in this scenario also creates the opportunity to support
the LRSB mission against Iranian nuclear missile facilities with medium range strike
aircraft creating a gap in the IADS, as they did at the commencement of Operation
Desert Storm, through which the LRSB can manoeuvre into an appropriate position from
which to deploy ordnance.209 However, the intention in the first Gulf War was to delay
the advance warning that the Iraqi military would otherwise have had of the forthcoming
assault.210 In this scenario, however, if a B-21 were tasked with deploying ordnance
against an Iranian nuclear missile launch site it is intended to remain undetected
throughout its time in Iranian airspace. If this is to be the case, it is reliant on its low
observable features, rather than supporting aircraft degrading the IADS. Furthermore, if
the ability to create a gap in the Iranian IADS exists, this reduces the potential advantage
of leveraging the B-21's low observable properties. Given that a medium range strike
aircraft tasked with deploying ordnance against Iranian nuclear facilities that is launched
from the same base as those that are intended to degrade the IADS has adequate range to
conduct its mission, the supporting operations increase the potential for its success, thus
reducing the need to deploy the B-21.
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Using an ICBM to strike a hardened static target in Iran remains an option for
U.S. policy-makers, negating the otherwise singular advantage that the long range
capability of the B-21 could provide in this scenario.

The seeming lack of a

conventional warhead on U.S. ICBMs is an impediment to the use of such a weapon as
any strike with today's ICBMs would, by definition, be nuclear, but former Defense
Secretary Gates's statement that “in addition to the nuclear deterrent… we have prompt
global strike affording us some conventional alternatives on long range missiles that we
didn’t have before” suggests that a conventional ICBM may be imminent, or possibly
already available.211 The development of non-nuclear ICBMs as part of a "Prompt
Global Strike" system with improved accuracy has the potential to reduce the political
impediment to conducting an inter-continental missile strike. However, this technology,
which is further considered below, is embryonic and, while it may provide an effective
capability in the future, it is conceptually and practically unproven. 212 Nevertheless, the
primary impediment to Prompt Global Strike is the missile propulsion and control, rather
than the warhead, and the emphasis on the creation of such a weapon suggests that
developing conventional long range strike via an inter-continental missile is a
consideration for the DoD.
The refusal of U.S. policy makers to agree to a "No First Use" policy, as well as
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review's pointed exclusion of Iran and North Korea as targets
for a nuclear strike, indicate the willingness of U.S. policy makers to deploy nuclear
211
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weapons, although this should be considered unlikely due to the broader political
ramifications of such a strike.213 In the event that Iranian policy makers cannot be
deterred, the destruction of the state military's nuclear capability represents an effective
method of preventing an overwhelmingly destructive attack on the populations of
neighbouring states. Military action, particularly when it may involve nuclear ordnance,
should be a measure of last resort due to its destructive possibility and potentially
unpredictable consequences. In this scenario, if the situation has deteriorated to the
extent that the launch of an Iranian nuclear weapon appears imminent, the strike must be
rapid and effective. Such deterioration is unlikely to be short-term, giving U.S. policy
makers the opportunity to secure basing or overflight concessions from the governments
of states that neighbour Iran. If this has occurred, the requirement for a long range strike
bomber could be reduced; assuming that the GBU-57A/B replacement ordnance is
operational no point in Iran would be out of range for an F-35 launched from Iraq,
Afghanistan, Bahrain, or an aircraft carrier off the coast of Dubai.214 Although in 2016
U.S. forces have access to bases in the region, notably in Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi
Arabia, as well as Afghanistan and Iraq, this is not guaranteed to be the case in the future
given the dynamic and volatile political landscape of the region.215 If such bases are not
available, or the GBU-57A/B replacement is not operational, the unique use of a B-2 or
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B-21 launched from U.S. territory is implausible without violating the sovereign airspace
of countries other than Iran.
The B-2 mission from Whiteman Air Force Base to Libya required two refuelling
points, one of which was provided by aircraft launched from western Europe.216
Although the direct distance from Guam to western Iran is similar to that from Missouri
to Libya, the logistical challenge of flying air-to-air refuelling aircraft from the same
location would be significant, exacerbated by the requirement of avoiding detection, as
well as the potential need to remain outside the sovereign airspace of states other than
Iran. It would also require a lead-time in excess of twelve hours between the launch
order being given and the strike occurring, even if the aircraft were already prepared for
the mission.
There is a degree of flexibility in this lead time which allows the decision-maker
to recall the aircraft before the strike occurs, and this has been proposed as a key benefit
of the LRSB.217 However, this attribute provides little advantage, particularly in this
scenario. The recall order would only be given if the situation changes and a strike is no
longer deemed necessary. Assuming that all diplomatic options have been exhausted
prior to the launch order being given, most plausibly the altered situation would be the
targeted state's policy makers being coerced by the knowledge that strike aircraft are en
route, thus demonstrating the willingness of their counterparts in the coercing state to use
kinetic force. This fundamentally undermines the concept of using a low-observable
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aircraft.

If Iranian policy makers were informed that the launch has occurred, the

twelve-hour lead time provides the opportunity for the pre-emptive deployment of the
nuclear weapons that the LRSB were intended to destroy.
Alternatively, if Iranian policy makers were informed of the aircraft's presence as
the systems close in on the target, they would be left with little time in which to
demonstrate an alteration of their policy. In addition, if Iran has procured or developed
an advanced air defence system, intimating the presence of a low observable aircraft,
particularly if a time deadline is given before they are scheduled to reach the point at
which weapons would be deployed, provides the Iranian military with the opportunity to
concentrate its defences and improve their chances of detecting the aircraft. The B-21's
likely lack of survivability post-detection means that the likelihood of a successful strike
would then be greatly decreased.
Basing B-21s in Diego Garcia brings the aircraft much closer to Iran than
launching from Guam. However, reaching a point at which ordnance can be effectively
deployed against a target in northern Iran remains outside the unrefuelled combat radius
of any of the existing U.S. LRSBs launching from Diego Garcia.218

Nevertheless, a

strike mission using only aircraft based on the island would be feasible. The B-21 is
likely to be able to be refuelled outside Iran's IADS in order to mitigate the risk to the
tanker aircraft and increase the potential that the strike aircraft can enter Iranian airspace
undetected, while having the range to be able, depending on their flight profile, to return
to Diego Garcia or to a rendezvous with a tanker aircraft south of Oman during their
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recovery. It is likely that the tanker could deploy from, and recover to, Diego Garcia in
conducting this supporting mission.219 This potentially provides U.S. aircraft with the
ability to conduct an effective strike on a target in northern Iran without using bases in
other states, and only systems with low observable properties would be required to enter
the Iranian IADS.
The range of the B-21 in this scenario provides compelling rationale for its use,
but it is not without shortfalls. The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments
suggested that "fighter aircraft [sic] could also contribute indirectly to future strike
campaigns by suppressing threats".220 If medium range strike aircraft were to be used in
this "tunnelling" role, it would be necessary to base them closer to Iran than Diego
Garcia, which necessitates either the deployment of an aircraft carrier or the use of bases
in overseas states.221

In such an event the added value of the B-21 is limited,

particularly given that the number of targets within the mission will be small; the same
results are likely to be achieved by a fleet of medium range aircraft launching from a
state close to the Iranian border.
The location of Diego Garcia provides U.S. policy makers with the opportunity to
use the B-21 as an escalatory tool to signal to their Iranian counterparts an intent to
conduct a kinetic attack, as well as providing a reminder of capability. In order for this
to be effective, however, their deployment would have to be advertised and, if the
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historic U.S. use of LRSBs as deterrent instruments is to be maintained, this suggests
that they will be flown close to Iranian airspace. Without the support of fighter aircraft,
this is an inherently risky action and is reliant on Iranian policy makers not acting
aggressively and ordering their own aircraft to attempt to shoot down the B-21s. The
need for visibility in conducting such a deterrent mission means that it is likely to take
place in daytime, which negates the survivability of the B-21. The Iranian destruction of
a B-21, particularly if it takes place in international airspace, is likely to engender a
strong response from U.S. policy makers. Understanding this, Iranian policy makers
may decide to pre-empt such an attack by launching their nuclear weapons, thus
undermining the deterrent effect of the B-21 deployed in Diego Garcia.
If Iranian policy makers perceive the deployment of B-21s to Diego Garcia to be
a threat, they may commence pre-emptive action, thus undermining the deterrent
intention of the deployment. Alternatively, the Iranian policy makers could order their
IADS to be bolstered on their southern border, particularly through the deployment of
fighter aircraft on patrols at their extreme range over the Arabian Sea. Although they
may be unable to detect the B-21s, the tanker aircraft that would be required to refuel the
bombers prior to their entering Iranian airspace if the B-21s are to recover to Diego
Garcia would be vulnerable. Even if fighter aircraft protecting the tankers could be
deployed from an aircraft carrier in the region, unless they were ordered to attack the
Iranian aircraft before air-to-air missiles were launched at the tankers, they could not
provide complete protection. This would be further complicated by the deployment of S400 missiles in southern Iran, which have the capability to strike an aircraft at ranges of
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around 250 miles.222 The distance of these batteries from Diego Garcia, as well as their
ability to be transported, would make it difficult to assure their destruction in a
preparatory attack conducted by B-21s from Diego Garcia. Consequently, without using
bases in states neighbouring Iran the deployment of B-21s to Diego Garcia without the
concurrent deployment of an aircraft carrier from which fighter support and strikes on
Iranian missile batteries can be orchestrated provides a limited increase in the ability of
U.S. to conduct effective airstrikes in northern Iran. Were an aircraft carrier to be
deployed in the Persian Gulf, the combat radius of the F-35 would facilitate a strike in
northern Iran, without the requirement for the B-21 to be present in the region.223
Launching an ICBM from the U.S. or, more likely given the political precedent
that the use of an ICBM would set, a SLBM, with a conventional warhead would provide
effective strike against a time-sensitive but static target without requiring the deployment
of U.S. troops in foreign states. Assuming that the missiles have been primed and aimed,
the time between the launch order being given and the target being struck would be less
than one hour.224 A submarine deployed in the Arabian sea could launch an SLBM that
strikes a target in Iran while minimising the possibility of detection by the Iranian Navy
as well as limiting the time available for Iranian policy makers to respond.
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trajectory of an ICBM launched from the U.S. would be likely to take it above the
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international airspace of the states over which it travels before striking a target in Iran.
Although it is possible to intercept ballistic missiles, doing so requires technological
capability demonstrated thus far by only a limited number of advanced militaries.225 The
potential for the Iranian military to prevent a U.S. ICBM or SLBM from reaching its
target is, therefore, as limited as their potential to detect a low observable aircraft
operating in their airspace. Consequently, the risk of mission failure in using either
system is similar.
In a ground campaign against Iranian forces, the B-21 would provide capability
augmentation due to its carrying capacity and range, as well as its low observability
giving additional protection against IADS. This would particularly important if the
Iranian military attempted to fight a conventional conflict. However, if the system is to
loiter it requires the IADS to have been decisively degraded. Operating in daylight puts
the system at risk of detection, and its presence will be known following its first strike.
The Iranian Air Force operates third- and early fourth-generation fighter aircraft that are
unlikely to survive combat with their U.S. counterparts. However, the likely lack of
survivability of the B-21 post-detection, particularly against aircraft, makes it vulnerable.
Similarly, loitering in an area in which S-400 and, potentially, S-500 anti-aircraft missile
systems are deployed is high-risk. Consequently, if the B-21 is to perform a consistently
valuable role in this phase of conflict in daylight as well as at night, Iranian air defences
have to be suppressed. The system itself can play a role in this, deploying anti-radar
missiles and conducting attacks on air bases. However, support from fighter aircraft will
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be required to provide protection until the Iranian IADS no longer represents meaningful
opposition.

The logistics of supporting and implementing a ground campaign

necessitates bases close to Iran. This facilitates the deployment of medium range strike
aircraft, supported by air-to-air refuelling aircraft. Air superiority must be achieved to
allow air-to-air refuelling to take place without forcing the aircraft providing CAS,
interdiction, or battlefield preparation to spend excess time in transit rather than on
patrol.
Air power's contribution in a broader military campaign in this scenario must be
balanced against the need to minimise civilian casualties in order to appease Western
press and public, reduce the potential for the U.S. military to be vilified, and facilitate a
transition of power wherein the new government's primary role is not simply to coordinate infrastructure repairs. Consequently, the majority of missions conducted by the
U.S. Air Force are likely to be tactical. This does not preclude the use of the B-21, and
its carrying capacity could be beneficial, but interdiction in support of ground operations
can be carried out by medium range strike aircraft. This would be more difficult to
maintain if the conflict centred on the geographic centre of Iran due to the distances
involved. However, the support of neighbouring states, notably Iraq and Afghanistan,
would provide U.S. forces with air bases that facilitate comprehensive aerial coverage of
Iran. This could be augmented with the capture and use of Iranian air bases.
Acting as part of a broader force preventing the Iranian military from disrupting
shipping in the Strait of Hormuz is a role that the B-21 could perform, particularly if it is
capable of deploying the LRASM, but is not optimised for such a capability and is
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unlikely to be effective in anti-submarine warfare. The straight is narrow, only twentyone miles wide, and the Persian Gulf itself covers only 97,000 square miles.
Consequently, the B-21's high-altitude capability gives the system the ability to act as an
ISR platform or network hub. However, because of the relatively limited area, a similar
role in monitoring surface vessels in the region could be performed by RPA, medium
range aircraft, or by U.S. naval vessels located in the Persian Gulf.226 Similarly, antisubmarine warfare and mine detection requires specialised equipment. This is unlikely
to be most efficiently or effectively deployed from the B-21. Consequently, the added
value of using the B-21 in naval warfare in this scenario is limited.
Although the potential for the B-21 to deploy the GBU-57A/B against an Iranian
nuclear missile facility appears to provide compelling rationale behind its procurement,
in reality it provides only a limited augmentation to U.S. military effectiveness. Without
bases in neighbouring states or overflight permission, there are serious logistical
challenges in mounting a strike mission, not least the need for numerous tanker aircraft
to support a single LRSB, which are inherently vulnerable to the more modern models of
anti-aircraft missiles. Should bases or overflight permission be granted, particularly
from Iraq, Azerbaijan or Turkmenistan, the three neighbouring states closest to Tehran,
the effectiveness of the B-21 is increased. However, these bases would also allow
medium range strike aircraft to hold targets at risk across Iran. In this event, the B-21
has an advantage only in its likely ability to deploy the GBU-57A/B. The completion of
the development of smaller ordnance that engenders similar outcomes negates the need
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for the B-21 to be the delivery system. Given that only a single strike is required against
a static target, an ICBM or SLBM is likely to be as effective in removing the Iranian
military's nuclear capability as the B-21 deploying the GBU-57A/B. However, given the
foreign policy outlook of U.S. policy makers, the likelihood of the complete breakdown
of relationships with governments in Middle Eastern states is extremely limited, and the
loss of basing rights in Qatar and Saudi Arabia is similarly unlikely. Consequently,
while the discussion around the potential use of ICBMs and SLBMs is valid, it is the
relative effectiveness of the B-21 measured against medium range strike aircraft that is of
greater value.
In an anti-shipping role against the Iranian Navy, a critical phase of the conflict if
the Strait of Hormuz is to remain open, the B-21 is unlikely to provide ISR or strike
capability that markedly enhances that which is demonstrated by existing systems. In the
ground phase of a conventional conflict against Iranian forces the B-21 would be a
benefit for U.S. forces, but it would initially require support from fighter aircraft to
ensure air superiority if it is to be used in a loitering capacity. If this is the case, what is
required is an aircraft optimised as a long-endurance CAS system, rather than pressing
into service an aircraft that is designed to evade radar detection and deliver strategic
strikes.
Hypothetical Scenario Four: Countering Assertive Russian Action in the Arctic
President Putin's belligerent and aggressive position has continued, and tensions
over the control of the Arctic have increased. Russian policy makers contend that the
region is part of Russian territory and have stated that any attempts by private companies
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or state actors to conduct operations without approval by Russian authorities represents
an attack on Russian sovereignty. Russian policy makers attempt to signal military
capability and intent through regular flights towards the airspace of NATO states by
Russian LRSBs.
Russian military forces have consolidated their position in the Arctic and have
permanent bases on Kotelny Island and in Alexandra Land. The central components of
the installations are surveillance and detection systems to intercept air, surface and
undersea approaches, with a limited A2AD network and an IADS. A high level of
defence spending has given the Russian military strong technological capability,
including fifth-generation fighter aircraft. In addition, the Russian military can to deploy
nuclear ground-launched missiles that have the range to strike the continental U.S.
The governments of European allies of the U.S. are concerned about an
escalation of a conflict with Russia, acknowledging that the mutual defence obligations
of NATO would oblige them to provide martial assistance were Russia to launch a
kinetic attack.227 Western European states have an IADS capability that can detect and
intercept Russian legacy LRSBs. However, the numerical advantage held by Russian
ground forces is such that they would be able to overwhelm Western European groundbased defences.
Strategic considerations for U.S. military action
U.S. military action in this scenario is intended to coerce Russian policy makers
into changing their behaviour, without instigating a hot war outside the Arctic region or
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causing a reactionary attack on U.S. citizens and infrastructure. The ultimate intention is
to reduce the threat to U.S. security through degrading the ability of the Russian military
to dominate the Arctic region, thereby asserting U.S. military superiority. There is
potential that this may take the form of a demonstration of force through a kinetic attack
on Russian military assets.
In accordance with the stated desire of the Obama Administration to work,
wherever possible, within international institutions, U.S. policy makers engage with their
international counterparts in the Arctic Council to resolve differences in the region and
create behavioural norms. Although a member of the Arctic Council and espousing the
"preservation of the Arctic as an area of peace and cooperation", the attainment of this is
undermined by Russian military deployments in the region and their policy makers'
claims on geographic regions that are of disputed ownership.228
Successful coercion of Russian policy makers through action in the Arctic region
may have broader foreign policy implications and strengthen the U.S. position in
attempts to coerce or deter other states from undertaking actions that could harm U.S.
security. Despite the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, both
Russian and U.S. policy makers appear to perceive the power of the other state as a
threat.229 Russian military action in former Soviet states, as well as involvement in
Syria, has strengthened the impression that the two states remain competitors. In this
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scenario, Russian action in the Arctic consolidates this impression. Leadership can be
demonstrated through a range of actions, but U.S. military strength continues to be an
important part of the national psyche and a cornerstone of international relationships and
agreements.230 The Arctic situation outlined in this scenario gives the U.S. military the
opportunity to demonstrate its continued superiority over its Russian counterpart. If
successful, this could act as a check on Russian policy makers who may otherwise
believe that the Russian military can be used to effectively challenge U.S. security, or the
security of its allies, thereby increasing the potential for escalation that results in a
military engagement. In addition, the successful coercion of Russian policy makers
through the actions of the U.S. military would also serve as a reminder to other states of
its strength. Russia, alongside China, represent competitors to the U.S. that are as close
to near-peer as the state has had for many decades. Forcing the Russian military to back
down, acknowledging the likelihood of their defeat by U.S. forces, would be a powerful
signal of the benefit of partnering with the U.S. military.
The success of a coercive strategy requires a demonstration of capability and,
significantly, willingness to act. The threatened or conducted actions must demonstrate
that the costs that can be imposed on Russia by the U.S. military have a proportionately
greater effectiveness than the reverse, and that these costs outweigh the anticipated
benefits of defiance.231 A willingness to act can be demonstrated through an escalation
ladder of signalling. There is no prescribed method of escalation, and it is impossible to
know what action would represent the point at which the strategy would be effective.
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However, in this scenario, particularly as the U.S. policy makers would be keen to avoid
actions that provoke kinetic retaliation and avoid an escalation into a hot war, it is easier
to demonstrate capability through shows of force than to prove willingness.
The existence of the Arctic Council and the NATO alliances should provide U.S.
policy makers and military with backing in any efforts to coerce Russian policy making.
However, members of NATO that do not have a vested interest in Arctic affairs may be
reluctant to provide their full support to an operation that risks escalation and the
triggering of Article Five without a demonstration of the benefits that they would
receive. Despite the Russian military's numerical superiority over European NATO
members, they are likely to suffer extensive losses in a hot war and lack the ability to
comprehensively prevent the advanced militaries of Western nations imposing costs.232
As a result, a demonstration of willingness by the policy makers of other NATO and
Arctic Council states to support U.S. activities provides considerable force
augmentation. It is therefore critical for the U.S. policy makers to also demonstrate that
they are acting in the common good, rather than solely for U.S. interests, and that they
value the support of allied militaries. In addition, the geographic position of Arctic
Council and NATO states also provide the U.S. military with the opportunity to broaden
its options for a strike that affects Russian interests, thus increasing the likelihood of
threatening Russian policy makers with costs that are great enough to render the coercive
strategy successful.
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Role of the B-21
Central in appraising the role of the B-21 in this scenario is considering the
rationale behind the deployment of Russian troops, and notably anti-aircraft systems, in
the Arctic.

Fundamentally, this basing is symbolic of power and ownership,

demonstrating Russian military strength and their ability to resist military action by
states whose policy makers challenge the Russian claims to areas of the Arctic. The
defensive systems also present a tactical challenge for U.S. forces who may otherwise
have routed aircraft over the Arctic to strike targets in Russia.233
There are two broad military options available to U.S. policy makers to coerce
their Russian counterparts to remove these forces. The first is to impose costs on Russia
through actions in other theatres in which Russian policy makers have an interest in
controlling, either using the action to signal willingness to engage militarily or using the
continuing imposition of costs as a bargaining chip with which to cause the removal of
Russian military bases in the Arctic. The second is to demonstrate that the U.S. military
is capable of imposing costs directly on the Russian forces in the Arctic and that their
presence is not an impediment to U.S. military action.
Unless Russia engages in overtly aggressive action in the Arctic or deploys
incontrovertibly offensive weapons systems, it is unlikely that a pre-emptive strike
against a target on the Russian mainland would be legally acceptable; if the U.S. wishes
to be a global leader, such a blatant violation of international law and moral acceptability
would be difficult to countenance and risks the possibility of the situation escalating to a
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nuclear exchange. Military force could be leveraged in support of organisations that are
acting against Russian control in Eastern Europe, notably the state government in
Ukraine whose military is engaging non-state actors who are at least tacitly supported by
Russian troops.234 However, even in the event that U.S. policy makers commit to
providing combat support, the B-21 is not optimised for the unconventional nature of the
conflicts.

Direct attack support can be provided from dedicated CAS aircraft and

ground-combat equipment based in the state, with ISR roles performed by platforms that
have been designed for that function, such as the MQ-9.

The ranges involved in

supporting government forces in Ukraine facilitates the deployment of medium range
strike aircraft in both strategic and tactical roles, and the advantage of the extended range
offered by the B-21 provides limited increase in the effectiveness of aerial strike.
The deployment of U.S. forces in order to demonstrate willingness to use military
force may have an effect on Russian policy makers, but using the B-21 to maintain an
aggressive posture is illogical. The Russian Air Force's operation of its LRSB fleet is
indicative of the perceived psychological value of their presence, rather than
demonstrating their value as an ordnance delivery system or platform in the event of an
escalation to hot war. The Russian aircraft that are used to approach U.S. and NATO
airspace, typically the Tu-95 'Bear', lacks any low observable properties. Detecting their
presence and intercepting the aircraft is relatively simple.235 However, such flights allow
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the IADS of U.S. and NATO states to be tested, and are a signal of willingness to use
military force.
It is notable that when U.S. policy makers demonstrated U.S. military power
following the test of a North Korean warhead in January 2016 it was B-52s that were
flown close to North Korean airspace, rather than B-2s.236 Giving the opposition the
opportunity to gain first-hand experience of the capability of a system that relies on its
low observable properties for its survival is counter-intuitive.

The U.S. Air Force

deployed B-52s to Sweden in 2015 in an attempt to coerce Russian policy makers into
taking a less aggressive position on Ukraine, but it was the forward deployment of the
systems and the consequent rapidity with which they could launch a strike that was
intended to evoke a response, rather than ongoing flights and probing Russian IADS.237
Similarly, the potential outcomes of deploying the B-21 close to Russian airspace are
generally antithetical to the desired coercive intentions due to the requirement for
visibility. If the aircraft is flown at night and its low-observable properties prevent its
detection by Russian anti-aircraft systems, its lack of visibility limits its value as a
coercive tool. This can be overcome by conducting an action that has an observable
outcome within an area that should be covered by the Russian IADS. Achieving this
without violating Russian airspace is difficult. If the aircraft is flown at night and its
low-observable properties do not prevent its detection by Russian anti-aircraft systems,
its value as a coercive instrument is greatly reduced. Operating in daylight increases the
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system's visibility, but also provides Russian forces with the opportunity to practice
interceptions. This would be beneficial if such attempts were routinely unsuccessful, but
may ultimately result in the effectiveness of the B-21 being reduced in its ability to
deploy ordnance successfully and, by extension, to coerce or deter action by foreign
policy makers.
The second option for U.S. policy makers is to degrade the Russian military
forces in the permanent bases in the Arctic. The likelihood of kinetic force being used in
this scenario remains limited due to the potential for escalation into a broader hot war
that could impose significant costs on the U.S., regardless of the eventual outcome.
Nevertheless, it is in this scenario that the B-21 can provide greater effectiveness than
any other currently fielded weapons systems.
The S-400 missile batteries deployed on Katyn Island and Alexandra Land
represent a threat to U.S. aircraft attempting to operate in their vicinity; even the B-2
may not be immune from detection and engagement by the system.238 The S-400 has a
maximum range of 250 miles, marginally greater than the 217 mile range of the JASSM.
Consequently, it seems likely that a fifth-generation medium range strike aircraft would
be able to enter the periphery of the airspace covered by the S-400 batteries, launch a
JASSM at a static target, and exfiltrate before affective anti-aircraft action can be taken.
Using the B-21, multiple missiles can be launched from a single aircraft in a single
mission, increasing the number of aiming points.

However, in this scenario the

operational value of striking multiple targets in a single mission is reduced by the
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overarching requirement of demonstrating capability. Striking a single target can be as
effective a demonstration of capability as multiple strikes.
Consequently, the critical attribute of the B-21 over a medium range strike
aircraft in this scenario is the ability to manoeuvre into an appropriate firing position
following a launch from the U.S. The closest permanent U.S. military airstrip to Kotelny
Island is Eilson Air Force Base, Alaska, 1,700 miles away. A cruising F-35 would be
capable of manoeuvring into position to deploy a JASSM against Russian military
positions on Kotelny Island with one air-to-air refuelling, but would require two further
full refuellings in order to return to Eilson Air Force Base. The presence of the tanker
aircraft is likely to be detected by Russian radar, limiting the degree of surprise that the
strike aircraft can achieve. In addition, the refuelling aircraft represent a keystone of a
strike mission in this scenario, and their destruction could be catastrophic to its potential
success. Consequently, protection from Russian fighter aircraft would be required, as
well as ensuring that the tankers remain outside the range of anti-aircraft missiles based
in the north-eastern reaches of the Russian mainland.

Although not a logistical

impossibility, particularly given the superiority of U.S. fighter aircraft over their Russian
counterparts, it adds a greater degree of complexity to the use of medium range aircraft
launching out of the U.S. mainland. The climactic conditions in the region negates the
option of deploying an aircraft carrier to facilitate the launch of medium range aircraft

115

from closer to Kotelny Island.239 The B-21, however, is likely to have the range to reach
Kotelny Island and return to a base in Alaska without requiring refuelling.
Alexandra Land is out of realistic range for medium range aircraft launching out
of the U.S. It is also out of range for a B-2, and thus probably the B-21, without air-toair refuelling taking place, although only one refuelling would be required, likely to be in
the region between the U.K. and Iceland. Notably, this is out of the range of fighter
aircraft launching from Russia.240 In both the potential strikes on Alexandra Land and
Kotelny Island, the B-21 may have a further advantage over medium range strike aircraft
in its ability to deploy long range air launched cruise missiles; the U.S. ALCM-86, while
only deployable from a B-52, has a maximum range of over 1,500 miles, facilitating the
deployment of ordnance from well outside the range of Russian ground-launched antiaircraft missiles.241 The creation of the new LRSO cruise missile could, however, negate
this advantage.
A strike on Alexandra Land or Kotelny Island could also be conducted with land, sea- or submarine-launched long range cruise missiles, without the need to deploy U.S.
troops overseas. A notable drawback of this approach is the difficulty of differentiating
between the launch of a nuclear and a conventional ballistic missile. Even if the U.S.
used an ICBM with a conventional warhead, Russian policy makers would be unable to
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identify it as non-nuclear prior to its detonation, which has the potential to lead to
dangerous escalation.

A submarine-launched missile strike on Alexandra Land or

Kotelny Island may be effective in degrading the Russian military forces but, like the B21, the launch vehicle is likely to rely on its low-observable properties to evade
interception, and the missile launch may also be mistaken for a nuclear strike. The
probable escalation of the conflict to the point at which a strike on the Russian forces is
deemed necessary gives U.S. submarines the opportunity to manoeuvre into an
appropriate firing position, but also provides Russian forces with a window of
opportunity to deploy defensive systems and make loitering in the region more
challenging.
Deploying U.S. aircraft to Norway would increase the options available to strike
Alexandra Land. In addition, deploying strike systems to northern Norway is a signal of
willingness to Russian policy makers to use military force as part of a coercive strategy.
However, the potential effectiveness of medium range strike aircraft in conducting a
kinetic attack on Alexandra Land means that it is not an absolute necessity that it is the
B-21 that is deployed. Tromsø lies just under 900 miles from Alexandra Land, and it is
technically feasible for a cruising F-35 to deploy a JASSM at the extreme of its range
and return to an air base in Norway without refuelling. In reality, it is likely that an airto-air refuelling would be required to provide the strike aircraft with the opportunity to
operate within a performance envelope beyond simply optimising their flight profile for
fuel efficiency. This is particularly the case given that the F-35 relies on its survivability
post-detection, rather than solely on its low observable properties making it invisible to
adversaries. Norwegian policy makers have an interest in ensuring that Russia does not
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control the Arctic, given their proximity to the region and involvement in the Arctic
Council.242

Nevertheless, the political ramifications of launching a strike from

Norwegian territory could be significant, drawing a response from Russia that imposes
costs on Norway, potentially through kinetic action. This could also lead to further
escalation if NATO's Article Five is invoked. Consequently, the prosecution of this
military action requires a unity of purpose between U.S. and Norwegian policy makers
and, potentially, a further commitment to Norway to offset or prevent any imposition of
costs.
Using the B-21 to strike Russian military positions on Kotelny Island is not the
only military option available to U.S. policy makers but, given the existing weapons
systems, it is likely to provide the most efficient strike solution. However, unless it is
capable of carrying an air-launched cruise missile with a range of over 400 miles, it will
be required to rely on its low observable properties for its survival within the Russian
IADS. Should the new LRSO cruise missile have the range expected at this stage of its
development, its carriage by the F-35 negates the need for the B-21 as the deployment
mechanism. The F-35 could deploy the ordnance from outside the Russian IADS, and
conduct the entire mission without requiring air-to-air refuelling.
Similarly, if U.S. policy makers were willing to act unilaterally in this scenario, a
strike on Alexandra Land is likely to be feasible for a B-21 launching out of the U.S.,
provided that air-to-air refuelling is conducted. It would not be a logistical impossibility
for the refuelling aircraft to also launch from the U.S. mainland. Assuming that the
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systems remained undetected prior to the strike occurring, this also mitigates the
potential for a missile launch being misinterpreted as a nuclear strike. Generating an
alliance with Norwegian policy makers to use air bases in northern Norway would,
however, facilitate the use of medium range strike aircraft, as well as providing the
opportunity to demonstrate willingness to Russian policy makers through the deployment
of offensive systems close to their border.
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Chapter Five: Cost Considerations and Psychological Impact

Untrammelled Soviet military spending played a role in the regime's ultimate
demise.243 While there is no suggestion that the procurement of the B-21 represents a
similar threat to the U.S. political structure, regardless of the degree of military
effectiveness that the B-21 may represent its cost and budgetary implications merit
consideration.

The decision to procure the B-21 is conceptually flawed from an

operational military perspective. However, in pure cost terms the system is affordable,
even within the budgetary constraints imposed on the DoD following the 2011 Budget
Control Act and subsequent sequester.244
The public cost estimates for the system released by the DoD in 2010 indicated
that the entire programme would cost £55bn, roughly $550m per aircraft.245 The DoD
Fiscal Year 2016 Budget Request cites this programme as the fourth most expensive
project of the "Aircraft and Related Systems" category of weapons procurement.246
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Nevertheless, "affordability" has been a precept of U.S. Air Force pronouncements
regarding the system with emphasis on the "cost considerations". 247 An inauspicious
precedent on defence spending has been set by the DoD, with the spiralling costs of
developing the F-35 in particular leading to intense criticism.248

Concerns have been

voiced at the potential for the B-21 to demonstrate a similar cost escalation, particularly
because of the Future Years Defense Plans since 2014, in which the budget for Research
and Development is indicated to increase year-on-year.249

Nevertheless, past

performance is no guarantee of future performance, and the potential for the B-21 to run
over budget should be examined on its own merits.
The B-21's procurement process, which emphasised the need for bidding
companies to conduct a high level of research and development before bidding for the
contract, has resulted in the chosen design having a "level of maturity" greater than that
usually seen in military hardware at the same stage in the procurement cycle.250
Consequently, although the system will be further modified before its full-scale
production and operational readiness, it is likely that the costs of the additional research
and development process will be minimised. Research and development costs for the B21 are also suppressed by the emphasis on the system building on existing technology,
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rather than designing individual components "from scratch".251 It is the cost of research
and development that has raised the overall spending on the F-35 to over $1tn; the unit
cost is, at $142m, only around $25m higher than the cost of the McDonnell-Douglas F15K 'Strike Eagle', in 2016 dollars, despite a generational shift in capability. 252 This is
buttressed

by

the

B-21's

"modularity"

and

connections

to

"off-board

capabilities...provided by other aircraft and orbital reconnaissance satellites".253
Consequently, incremental improvements or modifications to individual components can
be made to maintain the B-21's anticipated technological edge without affecting the
broader system.254
Despite this flexibility, in order to maximise the potential for the B-21 to stay
within budget U.S. policy makers must retain a consistent approach to the development
of the system and the design brief. During the procurement process the Lockheed Martin
F-22 'Raptor' suffered "requirements creep", with the design of what was intended to be
an air superiority fighter aircraft being modified to incorporate a ground attack
component.255 This caused a consequent increase in the time and costs associated with
the research and design phase. If similar changes of direction are made to the B-21's
design brief, cost escalation is likely. Absent this scenario, aside from reservations based
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on the historic procurement of U.S. military systems there is little reason to suggest that
the cost of procuring the B-21 will grow exponentially, above inflation, from the price
currently budgeted.
Defence spending in the U.S. Federal budget for the 2015 Fiscal Year accounted
for more than $600bn.256

Within this, $63.6bn was budgeted for research and

development and $100.8bn on procurement.257 Assuming that defence spending follows
a broadly similar pattern for the next decade, the procurement of the B-21 represents an
outlay of less than one percent of total U.S. defence spending. Unforeseen situations
may result in drastic changes to the U.S. defence budget in the coming years but, unless
an unexpected and exponential increase in the cost of the B-21 occurs, cutting this
procurement programme is unlikely to have a significant economic impact.
The industrial context of procuring the B-21 provides a backdrop for the decision
to follow the Northrop Grumman design. Two bids were submitted for the production of
B-21, one from Northrop Grumman and one a joint bid from Lockheed Martin and
Boeing.258 The DoD insisted that the selection decision to select the Northrop Grumman
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bid was made solely on the basis of the capability of the proposed systems.259
Nevertheless, had Lockheed Martin - Boeing been awarded the contract for the B-21, it
is likely that the manned military aircraft design arm of Northrop Grumman would have
been put under threat of closure.260 Conversely, the locked-in payments for the F-35
ensure funding for Lockheed Martin's military aircraft department, and the KC-46
'Pegasus' tanker aircraft, based on a Boeing 767 airframe, will maintain the company's
ties with the U.S. military.261

U.S. Secretary of Defense Carter, formerly chief of

technology acquisition at the Pentagon, warned against actions that

"reduce

the...technological talent pool" available to the DoD.262 By awarding the contract for the
B-21 to Lockheed Martin, U.S. policy makers would have jeopardised competition
between design groups and potentially limited the capability of the U.S. technology
industry to produce cutting-edge military aircraft. Regardless of the veracity of the claim
by Frank Kendall, the head of Pentagon acquisition, that "industrial base issues would
play no role in the contract decision", awarding the contract to Northrop Grumman
maintains diversity in aviation technology.263
However, keeping Northrop Grumman's manned military aircraft design bureau
open should not in itself be the rationale behind the production of the B-21. If the
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ongoing existence of this department was of central concern to the DoD, funding could
have been provided for alternative projects that would improve the effectiveness of the
U.S. military through leveraging their knowledge-based point of difference, low
observable aircraft technology, rather than committing to the creation of the B-21.
Although this may necessitate greater collaboration between aircraft design departments
in the creation of future airborne systems, the emphasis on the modularity of new
military equipment suggests that a trend in this direction is already emerging.
The procurement of the B-21 is a demonstration of the continued technological
capability of the U.S. military industrial complex, and supports the premise that the U.S.
military must have a capability advantage over its potential foes.264 In spite of its
diminishing ability to remain undetected in advanced IADS, the low observable
properties of the B-2 have not yet been reproduced by China or Russia, despite policy
makers of both states suggesting that the development of low observable LRSBs may
occur in the near future.265
Regardless of its ultimate cost, the production of an expensive, high-technology
piece of equipment is also further confirmation of the U.S. commitment to defence
spending and maintaining pre-eminence in military equipment, an indication to policy
makers from other states that the U.S. is able to wield major military capability in
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defence of its interests. This impression of strength may also provide a degree of peace
of mind to certain portions of the U.S. population. The size and potential firepower of
the B-21 gives the aircraft a powerful symbolism, one that is encapsulated by the regular
use of B-52s in flyovers at U.S. sporting events. It is, however, difficult to quantify the
value of this psychological component, particularly given the lack of certainty about the
responses of the state policy makers of other states. It may be that the dissuasion
component of the B-21's procurement has an effect, and the proven ability of the U.S. to
develop an aircraft that major state adversaries are incapable of replicating in the short
term deters those states from challenging the U.S. position, thereby providing U.S.
policy makers with greater latitude for action. However, this is not a given. If state
policy makers from a near-peer competitor perceive the U.S. to be a threat, then the B-21
may lead them to greater defence spending in order to match the U.S. military, an action
which could result in an upward spiral of arms production if U.S. policy makers
continued to base their procurement decisions on the basis of symmetric capability. In
addition, it would be a mistake to assume that defence spending by states will always
focus on identical capabilities, or even that greater spending necessarily results in a more
effective force in any given scenario. If the policy makers of another state perceive a
weakness in the U.S. military, they may be able to exploit it without requiring a level of
spending that matches U.S. military expenditure, further undermining the potential that
the dissuasion strategy would secure the U.S. forces as the dominant global military,
capable of conducting effective operations against any adversary and under any
circumstance.
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The lack of augmentation to the U.S. military's effectiveness that is provided by
the B-21 undermines the potential psychological effect of demonstrating technological
capacity through the aircraft's procurement. If the military strategists of a near-peer
competitor of the U.S. truly appreciate the effectiveness of U.S. forces and the limited
role that the B-21 will play in enhancing it, unless their policy makers believe that
absolute technological parity in every facet of the military is required in order to prevent
effective U.S. military action, the mere production of the B-21 is of limited value.
The B-21 certainly demonstrates the ability to of the U.S. military industrial
complex to produce an aircraft that is unique. However, as the aircraft does not represent
a transformation of U.S. military effectiveness, this demonstration is unlikely to alter the
balance of power and perception of the U.S. military as a potential adversary. For
example, although it is perhaps less headline-grabbing than the B-21, the procurement of
an air-launched long range cruise missile with autonomous target-selection capabilities
would demonstrate both technological expertise in advance of near-peer competitors
while increasing the effectiveness of the U.S. military. Technological advantage in
military equipment is, although not a panacea, undoubtedly beneficial. Demonstrating
the ability to consistently produce weapons systems that are more advanced than those of
potential adversaries can impact their willingness to engage in military conflict.
Consequently, concentrating resources on the development of unique and advanced
technology that would provide the U.S. military with a truly overwhelming advantage in
its efforts to defeat potential adversaries could be of benefit to U.S. policy makers.
Because of its failure to radically increase the effectiveness of the U.S. military, the B-21
does not represent this technology.
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Chapter Six: Alternative Future Long Range Strike Systems

A 'Prompt Global Strike' system and a weaponised version of Northrop
Grumman's 'Global Hawk' RPA have been touted as possible alternatives to the B-21.
Both have the potential to provide long range strike capability and augment U.S. military
power projection, but neither are universal solutions for U.S. security in the short term.
Nevertheless, their potential capabilities are impressive enough to merit further
exploration.
Prompt Global Strike
'Prompt Global Strike' is an embryonic system that is intended to give U.S. policy
makers the opportunity to strike any target on the globe from the U.S. in under an hour
without requiring the overseas deployment of U.S. personnel.266 Multiple designs have
been trialled but, as of January 2016, no decision has been reached on the form that the
system should take. However, as a foundation, the 'Prompt Global Strike' system is
intended to carry a conventional warhead and will use hypersonic propulsion technology
to manoeuvre at more than five times the speed of sound.267
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One of the primary benefits of Prompt Global Strike would be its conventional intercontinental strike capability, allowing a strike to be made from the U.S. that does not
automatically escalate the conflict to the nuclear level. In particular, and as significant
as the conventional nature of the warhead, if the initial launch of the Prompt Global
Strike warhead did not resemble that of an ICBM, it could mitigate the problem of an
inter-continental missile launch being misconstrued as the start of a nuclear strike. 268
This represents a technological challenge as the SCRAMJET propulsion required for
hypersonic flight cannot be used for an initial launch from the ground, but it is not an
impossibility.269 Furthermore, if there is any ambiguity with regards to the nature of the
warhead if it is detected at the point of launch or during the flight, it is likely that the
strike will occur before a response can be arranged. Consequently, its non-nuclear status
will be apparent and the likelihood of further escalation into nuclear conflict would be
reduced.
The hypersonic speed of Prompt Global Strike makes defending against it
difficult.

The technology required to intercept an ICBM is advanced, but defensive

systems are becoming increasingly sophisticated.270 Prompt Global Strike missiles, by
virtue of the speed and, potentially, lower observable characteristics than traditional
ICBMs, have a greater probability of reaching their intended target.
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However, despite these capabilities, Prompt Global Strike is not a panacea in all
conflict situations. As a system that is intended to be fielded in the U.S. and is designed
to launch quickly, as an escalatory tool it is of limited value, relying entirely on the
opposition's interpretation of U.S. policy makers' willingness to order a strike.

A

potential further corollary of this is that an opposition force who believe that the launch
of a Prompt Global Strike missile is imminent and lack the technology to defend against
it could launch a pre-emptive strike, which may be nuclear. In addition, it is difficult to
maintain an ongoing campaign using solely long range conventional missiles.
Consequently, its value is against an opponent that is vulnerable to strategic strike.
While the rapidity of the missile may facilitate an attack on some targets of opportunity,
realistically it is static and permanent targets that will be the focus of attacks and such
missions are reliant on accurate targeting data.
In terms of delivering ordnance to a target at extreme range, Prompt Global
Strike offers strong potential capability for the U.S. with a system that could provide
rapid inter-continental conventional strike; a system that is technologically revolutionary.
However, the unproven nature of the system is problematic as there is no realistic
expectation of it being fielded in the foreseeable future. Over $1.1bn has been spent on
the development of a Prompt Global Strike system between FY2008 and FY2016, with
few concrete results.271 Consequently, while the potential capabilities of Prompt Global
Strike hint at an effectiveness that could dramatically enhance the U.S. foreign policy
toolkit, particularly in deterring aggressive action by policy makers of states with high
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levels of technological development, it is not a system against which the efficacy of the
B-21 should be considered in isolation.
High-Altitude Long Endurance Remotely Piloted Aircraft
The U.S. military and intelligence community have frequently used RPA since
their initial deployment in Bosnia in 1995, with the systems truly entering the public
consciousness with their use in Afghanistan and Iraq from 2003. 272 The primary HighAltitude Long Endurance (HALE) aircraft have been the General Atomics MQ-1
'Predator' and MQ-9 'Reaper', with the latter's strike capability adding a new dimension
to its operational function. Northrop Grumman's RQ-4 'Global Hawk' is an evolution of
these systems. It is powered by a turbofan engine rather than a turboprop, providing a
fifty percent increase on the speed of the MQ-9 to over 350mph, and a twelve-fold
increase on the system's maximum range which, for the RQ-4, now stands at over 14,000
miles.273 If the nascent air-to-air refuelling capability is honed, the systems could stay
airborne almost indefinitely. Excluding the research and development costs, each unit of
the system cost $131.4m.274 This figure is skewed by the relatively few systems that
were purchased, but nevertheless it is more expensive, per unit, than the projected price
of the B-21.
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However, despite the suggestion that the B-21 would be "optionally manned",
given the technological problems that have beset existing U.S. RPA it seems unlikely
that it will be remotely piloted from the outset. Even with comprehensive upgrades a
weaponised version of the RQ-4 is unlikely to provide the effectiveness that would merit
the replacement of existing strike aircraft in the near term, particularly in a hot war with
a technologically advanced opposition.

This would remain the case unless a

breakthrough can be made in the speed, manoeuvrability or radar signature of RPA
without compromising strike capacity. In addition, the payload of the existing U.S. RPA
is relatively limited; even the RQ-4 has a carrying capacity of less than half of the weight
of a single JASSM, limiting its strategic strike potential.275 The Northrop Grumman X47B 'Pegasus' represented a breakthrough of sorts, with the aircraft demonstrating a
degree of low observability, and a rapidity unmatched by existing U.S. RPA, in addition
to launching from and recovering to an aircraft carrier.276 However, the aircraft was
purely developmental and had no carrying capacity. Consequently, while the X-47B
demonstrated something of the potential of military RPA, it requires considerable
evolution if it is to be effective in a warfighting capacity.
The comparison between B-21's capabilities and the current tranche of RPA is
not entirely reasonable given the lack of confirmed performance data on the B-21 and the
potential for the development of remotely piloted aircraft in the coming decade. In
unconventional warfare against a non-technologically advanced opponent, where there is
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limited risk of their being intercepted, RPA can be superbly effective in an ISR role and
performing tactical or strategic strikes with relatively light ordnance, potentially
including the B61 tactical nuclear bomb. However, the development that would be
required for one of these aircraft to carry and deploy even a single long range cruise
missile effectively appears to be some way off.
It is obvious that the B-21 not the only long range strike option to hold targets
that are in contested air environments at risk, even when they have the protective buffer
of distance from deployed U.S. forces. Nevertheless, the challenges of developing a
'Prompt Global Strike' system or HALE RPA with a greater range but similar carrying
capacity to the B-21 appear to support the argument that the B-21 is a good investment,
not least because both Prompt Global Strike and a purpose-built HALE RPA are unlikely
to be fielded before the B-21, and certainly demonstrates the capability of the aircraft.
However, this does not change the fact that the B-21 offers a limited improvement to the
effectiveness of existing systems, and a fleet of fifth-generation medium range strike
aircraft provide similar destructive capability and more flexible escalatory potential,
while according more closely with the intended shape of U.S. interaction with the global
system.
Considering the capabilities of 'Prompt Global Strike' provides an indication of
the overarching challenge of using conventional long range missiles as a tool to advance
political objectives due to the relative lack of escalatory potential. However, it also
highlights the possibility of using a delivery mechanism other than an aircraft to deploy a
warhead against a strategic target. This is the function that is, in theory, the primary role
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of the B-21.

The use of ballistic missiles, whether inter-continental or submarine-

launched, is not necessarily universally appropriate, but with regards to effectiveness
based on the likelihood of destroying a target, it remains as valuable as the B-21.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion

The central consideration of the value of a weapons system is its effectiveness;
not simply raw performance, but its ability to effect the mission required by the policy
makers that order its use. Although predicting future requirements is challenging, this
consideration must also be the foundation of the procurement process. The suggestion
that "the choice of long range bomber could affect the U.S.'s military capabilities for at
least the remainder of this century" is reasonable, but it fundamentally misunderstands
the nature of procurement and requirement.277 The concept of maintaining like-for-like
hardware capability, prevalent during the Cold War, is anachronistic. This outdated
attitude was demonstrated in the requirement for a "broad range of capabilities" in order
to "hedge against" the uncertainty of future security requirements that was called for by
Peter Pace, the former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his assessment of the
2005 Quadrennial Defense Review.278

The shortfall in effectiveness is of greater

importance, from a relative or individual perspective, and would indicate the inability of
the U.S. military to perform the role for which it is required. This is linked to, but not
universally paralleled by, capability. Nevertheless, the procurement of the B-21 provides
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no notable improvement to the effectiveness of the military toolkit available to U.S.
policy makers.
The B-21 is a system that has been designed "for a war that no-one wants to
fight".279 Precision weapons facilitate the use of LRSBs in some form of CAS role, but it
is evident that this is not the primary intended function of the B-21. More significant is
the implicit suggestion that the mere presence of the system would be sufficient to deter
potential adversaries from engaging in action that may be harmful to the U.S.
Undermining this suggestion is the fact that the B-21 does not enhance the ability of U.S.
policy makers to demonstrate the "Four Cs" inherent in deterrence.
Although deploying "a nuclear capable bomber...sends a message", there is not
necessarily an indication of "commitment".280 The ability of U.S. policy makers to
signal through the use or deployment of military forces is valuable; reliance on an
"escalation scaffold" creates the potential for the U.S. policy makers to be forced into
military action in otherwise unfavourable circumstances should the threat of force not be
heeded. LRSBs can be used as a mode of signalling; the deployment of Russian LRSBs
in the North Atlantic has been described as "sabre rattling" by U.K. policy makers and
senior military personnel, and U.S. policy makers have deployed B-52s in the South
China Sea and flown them close to North Korean airspace as a reminder of military
strength and an indication of disapproval of Chinese and North Korean activities.281
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However, it is notable that B-2s are rarely used in this signalling capacity. The B-21
could replace the B-52 as a signalling tool, but it is not the only system that could do so.
F-22s have been deployed in South Korea to signal to North Korea, and the positioning
of the U.S. fleet, particularly aircraft carriers, has also been used as a signalling
mechanism.282 Ships are not always able to deploy as quickly as aircraft, so it is not a
like-for-like alternative, but the lack of a new LRSB does not fundamentally alter the
rungs of the escalation ladder available to U.S. policy makers.
Indicating commitment also requires more subtle signalling than the deployment
of military hardware and is reliant on the policy makers of an opposing group or state
believing that a threat will be carried out. The presence or otherwise of the B-21,
whether based in the U.S. or forward deployed, is indicative of capability, not
commitment.

Forward deploying, or aggressively operating, medium range strike

aircraft, particularly the F-35, presents a similar degree of effectiveness with regards to
military might, and would be a similar signal of U.S. power and commitment as the
deployment or operation of the B-21.
The "command and control" element of deterrence has been encapsulated within
the discussion surrounding the B-21 due to its ability to "be recalled" en route, unlike a
missile, increasing its flexibility and adding a further rung to the escalation ladder. 283
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This argument is based on the assumption that the aircraft would be launched on a strike
mission while negotiations were ongoing. Such an outlook seems flawed and is more
indicative of the potential lengthy time period between the launch of a sub-sonic aircraft
and the deployment of ordnance. Precipitating military action should be a measure of
last resort, after all other options have been exhausted. Once the decision has been
taken, the initial strike, particularly if it is strategic in nature, should be made with the
greatest expediency, accounting for operational factors that may impact the mission, such
as time of day over the target or the time required to array forces for a broader assault.
Were medium range strike aircraft to be forward deployed, a reasonable expectation in
the course of an escalatory process, a strike could be made with a similar or greater
degree of rapidity as a strike conducted using the B-21. In addition, the shorter time
between the launch of a missile with inter-continental range and its reaching the target,
as opposed to the strike being undertaken with the B-21, means that the window in which
policy makers must make a decision on conducting a kinetic attack is not radically
altered. This would be compounded if hypersonic inter-continental missiles were to be
developed.
Using the launch of the B-21 as leverage within negotiations is similarly flawed.
The basis of the capability and effectiveness of the B-21 as a strike system is its low
observability and thus its ability to maintain an element of surprise.

Giving the

opposition advanced warning of its arrival would potentially strip the system of some of
this advantage. Even if this were not the case, when the imminent application of kinetic
force has been threatened if a particular action has not been undertaken, and such an
action has not occurred, the opposition is signalling their belief that the threatened action
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will either not occur or can be withstood. The likelihood of this position changing after
they are informed that the B-21 has been launched and will conduct an attack seems
slim.
The degree to which the B-21 would enhance U.S. policy makers' "clarity of
intent and message" is negligible. It does not alter the positioning of thresholds for
action, nor does it necessarily change the dynamic of the action that can be threatened as
the B-21 is not unique in its ability to deploy any ordnance other than the GBU-57A/B.
Most importantly, this feeds into the "capability" pillar of deterrence. It is in this sector
that the B-21 would be expected to enhance the U.S. position, but the absence of the
system does not automatically compromise the overarching capability of the U.S.
military due to alternative systems offering an equal or greater degree of effectiveness.
It is likely that the B-21 will be a capable system at the point of its introduction.
However, the consequent effectiveness is defined by circumstance, and the
circumstances in which its capability is likely to provide a unique degree of effectiveness
are narrow.

In unconventional warfare, the threat to the B-21 would be limited.

Consequently, its carrying capacity and loiter capability can be leveraged to provide
CAS, air interdiction or battlespace preparation. However, this is not the role for which
the aircraft is intended or optimised and its use in such a scenario would indicate a
failure in strategic planning. If conflict against a technologically limited opponent is
considered to be a primary feature of U.S. military operations, U.S. defence procurement
should budget for the development of a combat aircraft optimised for such a scenario,
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rather than focusing funds and efforts on maintaining the system's ability to operate
within denied environments.
In a conventional conflict, the effectiveness of a system is a function of its ability
to deploy the requisite ordnance. The B-21 is reliant on its low observability and
consequent ability "to fly undetected" to perform this function.284 The claim of the
former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Transformation, Col.
Gunzinger, that "stealth as a concept will never be obsolete" is a truism and his
subsequent statement that bombers "need...to be survivable" reveals the flaw in the initial
argument: stealth is not synonymous with survivability.285

This is particularly

accentuated by the ongoing balance between offense and defence, with the evolution of
detection systems demonstrating the "high probability that stealthy aircraft can be seen
and intercepted within the next decade".286 The concept of low observability will, as
Gunzinger suggests, never be obsolete, but the practicality of maintaining a totally
stealthy system over an indefinite period in the face of technological advances in
defensive systems is likely to remain unobtainable. Consequently, the possibility of the
B-21 being able to loiter within an advanced IADS without detection is remote; the
"militarily successful strikes" that the U.S. LRSB fleet has prosecuted in post-2001
conflicts in the Middle East, particularly against mobile targets, is founded on their
ability to operate without a realistic threat being posed by the opposition. 287 In the event
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that U.S. forces have total air superiority, the potential to conduct air-to-air refuelling
negates much of the long endurance advantage held by the B-21 over medium range
aircraft.
Asserting that the B-21 is required in order to ensure the continued ability of U.S.
forces to "penetrate deep into...defended airspace" is a similarly outdated concept, based
on the early years of strategic bombing when ordnance deployed from an aircraft would
fall almost vertically.288 The requirement to strike a target in a conventional conflict that
is behind the front line is likely to remain but, with advent of long range air-launched
missiles, the aircraft deploying the ordnance can do so from an increased range.
Consequently, the significance of a deep-penetrating bomber is significantly reduced
and, as has been demonstrated in the scenarios analysed above, the required ordnance
can, in the vast majority of cases, be deployed against the same target by medium range
aircraft. The intended development of a new LRSO cruise missile capable of being
carried by a medium range strike aircraft would further reduce the requirement for the
deploying aircraft to penetrate deep into the opposition's airspace.
Underpinning the argument for the procurement of the B-21 is the concept that
"facilities in allied territory" will be of little moment, allowing the U.S. to conduct strikes
unilaterally and without the need for external support or basing.289 This argument is
undermined by the requirement for air-to-air refuelling if the B-21 is to launch from the
U.S. and conduct a mission to all but the eastern reaches of Russia or the northern
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portion of South America, and return without landing. In theory, tanker aircraft may also
be able to launch from the U.S. to support a mission, but the logistics of such an
operation are complex, requiring multiple aircraft to conduct refuelling operations to
enable the tankers themselves to remain airborne. More realistically, the B-21 would
require support from tanker aircraft based overseas, as has been the case for B-2
missions. As a result, the concept of the B-21 facilitating a withdrawal from overseas
basing without a consequent negative impact on the ability of the U.S. to deploy kinetic
force from the air is fanciful. Furthermore, the argument that states would allow U.S.
tanker aircraft to deploy in period of conflict or tension, but refuse to allow strike aircraft
to use the same bases, demonstrates a lack of understanding of the centrality of refuelling
aircraft to U.S. strike missions that use LRSBs. Consequently, it seems likely that a state
with a capable A2AD network would be as likely to target these bases as they would if
strike aircraft were to be deployed to them.
Analysing the value or likely consequences of following the grand strategic
options available to U.S. policy makers is beyond the scope of this paper, but
considering the role of the B-21 in these contexts provides further indication of the
awkwardness of its fit as a foreign policy tool, regardless of how U.S. national security
strategy evolves in the coming years.
Although the B-21 appears to support a "Core National Security" strategy, the
requirement for air-to-air refuelling and difficulty in maintaining consistent strategic
strike missions at extreme range undermines its value. The 'stopping power of water',
which has provided the U.S. population with a degree of protection from foreign
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military, is also a constraint on U.S. power projection. If the U.S. military is to conduct
operations against targets overseas with an aircraft that is intended to recover to the U.S.,
overseas bases are required. Given the "Core National Security" strategy's emphasis on
disassociation with overseas states, re-establishing relations to the point at which U.S.
forces can be deployed there is likely to be a lengthy process. As a territory, Guam's
Andersen Air Force Base provides a degree of permanence for military deployments
outside Hawaii or the mainland U.S. and does not require the permission of the
governing body of the island to remain in situ. It also provides a valuable base for the B21, which would be within range of the South and East China Sea, as well as mainland
China.

However, Guam may be impacted directly by China's A2AD network,

particularly given the development of the DF-26 missile. In addition, if U.S. policy
makers fear that an attack on the U.S. may emanate from the region, and defence
relationships with other states have not been maintained, the operation of U.S. forces is
likely to be predictable and the single operating location is at risk of being contained by a
technologically advanced opposition force.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, the B-21 would be antithetical to a
"Dominance" strategy, and its effectiveness were such a strategy to be followed could be
replicated by alternative systems.

In particular, the LRSB symbolises stand-off

capability, an attitude of keeping potential opponents at arm's length and conducting
strategic strikes. This is in contradiction to the principles of U.S. dominance, which
requires an impression of ongoing involvement. Without maintaining bases overseas for
tanker aircraft, from which medium range strike aircraft could also deploy, this cannot be
achieved with the B-21. Nevertheless, if the U.S. military's current reluctance to deploy
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the B-2 overseas, other than to Guam, is reversed with the B-21, it could be a signal of
commitment to allies. This rationale for its procurement is undermined by the likely
effectiveness of medium range strike aircraft being similarly forward deployed. An F-35
may not be able to deploy the same volume of ordnance, but it is likely to be able to
engage the targets that would be available to the B-21, with the same type of ordnance.
The sole exception to this is the GBU-57A/B, and this advantage would be non-existent
following the development of jet-propelled penetrating ordnance.
Cutting overseas defence commitments back on the basis of resource and threat,
as proposed by "Retrenchment", would facilitate the leveraging of the B-21's capability
to deploy quickly in the event of an escalating conflict. However, the impediments to it
demonstrating a unique efficacy within the "Core National Security", "Dominance", and
"Offshore Balancing" grand strategies are also apparent in this context. If the system is
to provide an "over the horizon" threat, air-to-air refuelling aircraft are likely to be
required to be forward deployed in order to provide the requisite support for aircraft
launching out of the U.S. These forward bases are not part of a policy of "great power
land grabs", but a necessary stepping stone to ensuring effective strike missions.290
Consequently, as part of an escalatory process, the deployment of medium range strike
aircraft to the air bases that were to be used by the tanker aircraft demonstrates a similar
probability of an effective strike, and thus is likely to represent as effective a deterrent or
coercive strategy as deploying the B-21. In addition, the challenge of demonstrating
commitment to allied states without the overseas deployment of the B-21 is as apparent
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within the "Retrenchment" strategy as it is within "Dominance", or even "Offshore
Balancing".
As a tool within a "Littoral Enforcement" strategy, the B-21 provides a degree of
"over the horizon" capability, albeit with the same caveat that it is likely that air-to-air
refuelling aircraft based overseas would be required if the aircraft was intended to launch
from and recover to a base in the mainland U.S., and removing U.S. forces from overseas
bases raises the question of commitment to allies. Critically, this also challenges the
perception that the B-21 can enable U.S. forces to be the decisive player in a conflict
without committing troops on the ground. In an unconventional conflict against a nonstate actor the B-21 may be able to offer extensive strike capability, but it is telling that
in the operations against ISIL it is RPA and medium range strike aircraft that are
performing the bulk of ground-attack missions, rather than the existing LRSB fleet.
Given the U.S. support for the Iraqi government in particular, and the desire of the
Obama administration to avoid committing ground forces, this would theoretically be an
ideal opportunity to engage LRSBs within what otherwise appears to be a "Littoral
Enforcement" strategy. Similarly, in a conventional conflict against technologically
advanced opposition, the decisive edge that the U.S. policy makers seek to provide is
unlikely to be generated by the B-21 alone, unless air superiority has already been
achieved. If this is not the case, unless the system operates only at night it will be
imperative that it is supported by fighter aircraft. If air superiority has been achieved, a
similar degree of effectiveness in ground attack operations is likely to be possible
through the use of medium range strike aircraft supported by air-to-air refuelling tankers.
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The U.S. 2015 National Security Strategy emphasises U.S. "leadership" while
retaining the ability to act unilaterally.291 Differing definitions of 'leadership' exist, and
the National Security Strategy gives no indication of the exact form that such leadership
will take. Nevertheless, it is reasonable to suggest that U.S. leadership would be founded
on maintaining and developing a network of global relationships with states whose
policy makers look to the U.S. for support, thus creating the opportunity for U.S. policy
makers to engender the collective action that they deem to be in the best interests of all
parties.

The "need for a new long range strike aircraft" to "execute the tenants

of...security strategy", as claimed by David Deptula, Dean of the Mitchell Institute for
Aerospace Studies, is therefore difficult to reconcile.292 The B-21 is a symbol of standoff power, disassociating the deployment of kinetic force from other operations, in spite
of the use of B-52s and B-1Bs in CAS roles. If the leadership ideals of the U.S. 2015
National Security Strategy are to be pursued, the procurement of a system that facilitates
the deployment of kinetic force in such a fashion does little to realise them.
Even as an accepted global leader it is not a given that the U.S. forces will have
basing rights in every state - Turkish policy makers' reluctance to allow U.S. forces to
deploy from the state for operations against opposition forces in Iraq being a prime
example.293 An inability to access "front-line states" represents a challenge to operations
by medium range aircraft, but it is by no means insurmountable, and the B-21 would not
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automatically negate them.294 This is particularly the case if U.S. policy makers are
reluctant to violate the airspace of states that deny the U.S. aircraft overflight rights. If
the situation is grave enough for such violations to be an accepted risk, medium range
strike aircraft with supporting tanker aircraft could be an effective alternative.
The psychological component of developing the B-21 giving the U.S. military
another capability advantage over their Russian and Chinese counterparts is only
superficially significant. It is, again, the potential effectiveness of the U.S. military that
can be leveraged and impacts the U.S. position in the global order, rather than the
capability of individual components within it.

Policy makers of states who see

themselves in competition with the U.S. should be concerned with the costs that U.S. soft
or hard power can actually impose on them, and their ability to respond to or pre-empt
the imposition of these costs.

The failure of the B-21 to radically improve the

effectiveness of the U.S. military means that the mere act of creating it is not in itself
going to drive a major alteration in the ability of U.S. policy makers to shape events.
The procurement of the B-21 is, therefore, a misguided policy based on a
mistaken conflation of capability and effectiveness, as well as institutional blindness to a
changing security context. Global leadership requires commitment to other states, and
the resolve and capability to honour these commitments. Even in the event that this
leadership is based on enhancing the ability of allied states to support themselves
militarily rather than relying on assistance from U.S. forces, it is important that the U.S.
military can respond to escalating situations and retain the ability to deploy kinetic force
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if the situation requires. The B-21 is not required for this to be achieved and the degree
of effectiveness that the aircraft would provide can be replicated with alternative
systems.
The concept that the U.S. long range bomber is able to deploy "weapons on target
from [its] home station" is only partially true.295 The function of a strike aircraft is to
deploy appropriate ordnance on a target and, for the U.S., the bomber's mission is to
deploy ordnance that holds targets at risk all over the globe. To attain this position, airto-air refuelling is required. Given this fact, medium range strike aircraft, appropriately
and realistically forward deployed, can demonstrate the same degree of effectiveness as
the B-21. The critical point is whether the aircraft can manoeuvre into position in order
to operate its sensors effectively and deploy this ordnance. The capabilities of the B-21
provide, at most, a limited degree of unique effectiveness. The "dazzling performance of
precision weapon-equipped fighters in Operation Desert Storm" is unlikely to replicated
in every scenario, and the aircraft did not perform effectively in every role, but it is an
indication of what the systems can achieve in modern warfare.296
Consequently, U.S. procurement should concentrate on the ongoing development
of new long range air-launched cruise missiles that can be carried by the F-35, and a
replacement for the GBU-57A/B. Contrary to the assertion that "replicating the new
bomber’s strike capacity with a standoff missile would require the Pentagon to design
and acquire a weapon it has never contemplated before", the creation of ordnance that
can strike targets without the launch vehicle entering contested airspace has long been a
295
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focus of development.

Again emphasising the delineation between capability and

effectiveness, the critical requirement is that the ordnance that is deployed by the U.S.
military can effect the destruction of the target. This remains the case regardless of the
launch vehicle. The carrying capacity of the B-21 will provide a capability advantage
over medium range strike aircraft, but classing this as a unique superiority in
effectiveness assumes the unlikely event that a multi-aircraft raid by medium range strike
aircraft is a practical impossibility.
It is only by tradition that the air arm of the U.S. nuclear triad has been perceived
to be based on the LRSB fleet. In reality, medium range strike aircraft such as the
Grumman A-6 'Intruder' and General Dynamics F-111 'Aardvark' have been critical
components of the nuclear strategic force.297 The likely ability of the F-35 to deploy the
B61-12 continues the tradition of air-launched nuclear weapons in the U.S. armoury.298
Given the U.S. policy makers' emphasis on minimising civilian casualties, and the
reluctance to engage in nuclear warfare, the development of air-launched strategic
nuclear weapons that have a warhead too large to be carried by a medium range strike
aircraft, thus limiting their effectiveness as the launch vehicle, seems unlikely.
Consequently, the decision not to procure a new LRSB would not markedly impact the
effectiveness of the U.S. military's nuclear triad.
The procurement of new weapons systems and ordnance is a multi-faceted
decision but, at its core, should be founded on anticipated military requirements. While
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the reasons for state policy makers to engage in conflict may be constant, its conduct is
constantly in flux, and weapons reflect this. It is always a temptation to maintain a
pathway of capability, making incremental improvements to existing systems regardless
of a changing security context. This is exacerbated by the potentially lengthy temporal
period for the procurement of a complex system, and the difficulty in accurately
predicting future requirements. Nevertheless, paradigm shifts in weapons technology
indicates that slavish adherence to previous policy is not universal. U.S. policy makers
now have the opportunity to embrace such a change without compromising the
effectiveness of their military. Rather than procure the B-21, U.S. policy makers can
construct a force that is optimised for twenty-first century conflict and U.S. national
security strategy, instead of remaining wedded to a weapons system whose effectiveness
is unlikely to be unique and is suggestive of an approach to conflict that remains rooted
in the Cold War.
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